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TEXTUALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF 
SCRIVENER’S ERROR 
John David Ohlendorf∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On March 24, 1876, the Ohio General Assembly passed an act intended to 
revise and regulate the exercise of local police power in “cities . . . having at the 
last federal census a population of two hundred thousand and over.”1  The act 
conferred general regulatory authority on a board of police commissioners to be 
appointed, for each city, by the Governor of the state.2  Besides giving each police 
board control over the local police force, the act also gave the new boards “all the 
powers now vested in the board of health,”3 and so as part of the overhaul, section 
18 of the act attempted to abolish all existing board of health offices.4  But a hitch 
somewhere in the process resulted in a drafting infelicity: the final language of 
Section 18 stated that “The officers of the board of health in cities to which this act 
is applicable . . . are hereby abolished.”5 
One suspects that the venerable doctrine of ita lex scripta est was not held in 
such high regard in late 19th century Ohio that the officers serving on the existing 
local boards of health feared for their lives.  In State ex rel. Attorney General v. 
Covington, the authority of the newly-created police and public-health boards of 
Cincinnati was challenged in a quo warranto action.6  The Attorney General, acting 
as relator for the state, argued that the 1876 statute was unconstitutional on grounds 
unrelated to the unfortunate 18th section, but the attorneys for the Attorney General 
apparently found in section eighteen an opportunity to introduce some humor into 
the courtroom, as well as take an additional jab at the statute:  “Just what 
‘abolished,’ as used in this section, was intended by the legislature to mean,” the 
attorneys noted, “might puzzle almost any one who would consult the dictionary 
for the technical definition of the word.”7  The counsel for the Cincinnati officials 
in defense, in a quite different spirit (apparently not finding the humor in the 
prospect of their clients being “abolished”) dryly responded:  
[t]he eighteenth section of the act in question abolishes certain offices, as the 
legislature might properly do.  The objection to this section is a mere play upon 
letters.  The section has no sense, unless the word ‘officers’ is read ‘offices.’  To 
abolish officers is to abolish offices, and can mean nothing else.8 
                                                                                                     
 ∗ Olin-Searle-Smith Fellow in Law, Northwestern University School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law 
School.  The author would like to thank John Manning for peerless advice and insight and for comments 
on several earlier drafts.  Any drafting errors or absurdities are of course my own. 
 1. Act of March 24, 1876, 73 Ohio Laws 70. 
 2. Id. §§ 1–2. 
 3. Id. § 2. 
 4. Id. § 18. 
 5. Id. (emphasis added). 
 6. 29 Ohio St. 102, 103 (Ohio 1876). 
 7. Id. at 105. 
 8. Id. at *110. 
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The court apparently agreed, correcting the error in an almost off-hand way.9 
I suppose that scrivener’s errors, like this one, make an easy prey for the gentle 
comedy of the bench and bar, much in the way that typographical errors in 
billboards, newspaper headlines, and church bulletins form an endless source of 
humor for late night talk show hosts.  But theorists of legal interpretation have long 
seen that scrivener’s errors pose a more serious problem.  The doctrine surrounding 
scrivener’s error stands considered as something of a cousin to the absurdity 
doctrine, which has roots extending to the earliest days of the American Republic.10  
More recently, the post-legal-process revival of formalist approaches to statutory 
interpretation on the bench, and their systematic defense in the academy, has made 
the problem of scrivener’s error increasingly relevant. 
The problem for a thoroughgoing and consistent textualism is fairly obvious: 
textualists argue that the text passed by both houses of Congress and duly signed 
by the President (or passed, over his veto, by the requisite supermajorities) is the 
exclusive source of law.11  But what is the textualist to do, then, when the text that 
makes it through these hurdles includes gaffes—like the Louisiana statute that 
allowed parties to impeach their opponent’s testimony, on cross examination, “in 
any unlawful way,”12 or the Arkansas law (Hart and Sacks’ chestnut) that treated 
the court stenographer’s transcript as a bill of exceptions on appeal until approved 
by the Chancellor, rather than after being so approved?13  In many cases of 
scrivener’s error, the legislative history makes plain that the suspicious wording 
was unintentional, but it is a familiar and central part of the textualist credo that it 
is the text of the law, and not the legislative history, that governs.14  Often, a literal 
reading of an erroneous text will lead to patent absurdities, but some textualists 
have challenged the validity of the absurdity doctrine, as well.15  Is the textualist 
judge really left trying to “abolish” state officers and allowing unlawful 
impeachment of witnesses?  If textualist theory rightly bars “imaginative 
reconstruction”16 based on legislative history and reinterpretation to avoid absurd 
results, is there conceptual room left for a doctrine of scrivener’s error? 
These questions are important ones, but surprisingly there has been a marked 
lack of effort, on the part of textualists, to answer them.  Aside from a handful of 
attempts,17 textualist theorists have been either unconcerned or uninterested in the 
                                                                                                     
 9. See id. at 117. 
 10. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2388, 2388–89 (2003).  I go 
on to challenge the relationship between the two doctrines.  See infra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 11. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 12. See Scurto v. Le Blanc, 184 So. 567, 574 (La. 1938). 
 13. See Johnson v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 229 S.W.2d 671, 672–73 (Ark. 1950). 
 14. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 11, at 29–37; John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 684–95 (1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 533, 547–48 (1983); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 86–117 (2006). 
 15. See Manning, supra note 10, at 2390. 
 16. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 101–05, 273–78 (1990). 
 17. Manning’s discussion of the problem is the best treatment of the issue to date, and it consists of 
a single footnote.  Manning, supra note 10, at 2459 n.265.  The three extended academic treatments of 
the problem of which I am aware, Michael S. Fried, A Theory of Scrivener’s Error, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 
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problem; even critics of textualism seem to have placed little emphasis on the 
threat posed by scrivener’s error to textualist theory.18  Textualist judges, who 
come face to face with actual examples of scrivener’s error, have gone a bit farther 
in articulating an approach to the problem,19 but it is hardly within their province to 
treat its conceptual moorings, theoretical implications, and evidentiary difficulties 
in any systematic way.  The result has been a textualist approach to the problem 
that is unsatisfactory in significant respects.20 
This neglect is unfortunate.  Scrivener’s error poses a significant challenge to 
textualist theories of interpretation, and if textualism cannot come up with an 
adequate answer to the problem of scrivener’s error, it is prima facie an 
unsatisfactory theory of statutory interpretation.21  Moreover, how textualists 
answer the challenge posed by scrivener’s error has the deepest implications for the 
theoretical foundations of textualism.  Finding conceptual room for a doctrine of 
scrivener’s error within a textualist theory that rejects reliance on legislative history 
and the absurdity doctrine goes to the very root of what divides textualists from 
intentionalists.22 
The burden of this article is to provide conceptual moorings for a textualist 
doctrine of scrivener’s error, to relate the problem of drafting errors to broader 
textualist theory, and to suggest how the theory of scrivener’s error advocated here 
might make a difference in practice.  In Part II, I briefly sketch the division in 
textualist theory between those who offer “intent-skeptical” justifications for 
textualism and those who prefer “non-intent-skeptical” arguments.  Part III takes up 
again the task already begun: describing the challenge posed by scrivener’s error to 
textualist theory.  I review two attempts by textualists to address the scrivener’s 
error problem, concluding that both ultimately fail, but in illuminating ways.  
Finally, in Part IV I lay out my own theory of scrivener’s error, grounded in a non-
intent-skeptical understanding of textualism that draws heavily on the work of 
Joseph Raz and Jeremy Waldron, and sketch how this newly-grounded doctrine 
                                                                                                     
589 (2000); Andrew S. Gold, Absurd Results, Scrivener’s Errors, and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 25 (2006); and David M. Sollors, The Scrivener’s Error Doctrine and Textual Criticism: 
Confronting Errors in Statutes and Literary Texts, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 459 (2009), have evoked 
little response. 
 18. There have been scattered attempts to use scrivener’s error as a cudgel with which to beat 
textualists, see, e.g., Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 377–83 (2005);  WILLIAM 
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 45–48 (1994); Larry Alexander & 
Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation is an 
Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 979–82 (2004); Recent Case, Indep. Ins. Agents of Am. v. 
Clarke, 955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1992), 105 HARV. L. REV. 2116 (1992), but no opponent of textualism 
seems to have laid out, in any systematic way, the challenge that Scrivener’s error poses to the theory.  
The most systematic treatment of the problem is Jonathan R. Siegel, What Statutory Drafting Errors 
Teach Us About Statutory Interpretation, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 309 (2001).  
 19. See Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 18–20 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United States 
v. X-Citement, Inc. Video, 513 U.S. 64, 82–83 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Green v. Bock Laundry 
Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527–30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Amalgamated Transit Union Local 
1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1092, 1097–98 (9th Cir. 2006) (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
 20. See infra Part IV.C. 
 21. This is a bold claim, but I believe it is justified.  See infra Part III.A. 
 22. The turn of phrase is, of course, brazenly appropriated from John F. Manning, What Divides 
Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006). 
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will look when put into the field against the different types of scrivener’s errors that 
are encountered by judges. 
II.  TEXTUALIST THEORY AND INTENT SKEPTICISM 
Textualism might be defined roughly as that method of statutory interpretation 
that assigns to statutory texts the meaning that a reasonable person, familiar with 
the conventions of language generally in use by members of the relevant linguistic 
community, as well as any more idiosyncratic terms of art and general structural 
conventions used by the legislature, would understand the words of the text to 
have.  Textualists “stick close to the surface meaning of texts, where possible,”23 
eschewing, on the one hand, the legislative history of the provision24 and, on the 
other, broader attributions of legislative purpose that go beyond the scope of the 
text itself.25  Scholars have offered many different justifications for the family of 
interpretive theories that are broadly textualist.  For our purposes, these diverse 
arguments may be classified into two camps: intent-skeptical and non-intent-
skeptical. 
Intent-skeptical arguments for textualism center on the air of paradox 
surrounding the idea of collective intent.  Can Congress—a group of discrete 
individuals but not an individual itself—meaningfully be said to have a unified 
intent?  These intent-skeptical arguments form the oldest and the most familiar 
class of justifications for textualism.  The general argument is often traced back, in 
its modern form, to the legal realist Max Radin,26 but of course the argument is 
much older than this—Joseph Story was hardly expressing a novel idea when, in 
his 1833 Commentaries, he derisively asked: “What would be said of interpreting a 
statute of a State legislature by endeavoring to find out, from private sources, the 
objects and opinions of every member, how every one thought, what he wished, 
how he interpreted it?  Suppose different persons had different opinions, what is to 
be done?”27 
In the modern debate, this intent-skeptical objection has found prominent 
exponents in Justice Scalia28 and Judge Easterbrook.  Easterbrook has shored up 
                                                                                                     
 23. VERMEULE, supra note 14, at 73. 
 24. See Scalia, supra note 11, at 29 (stating that “the objective indication of the words, rather than 
the intent of the legislature, is what constitutes the law”). 
 25. See Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (“[N]o legislation pursues its 
purposes at all costs.”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory 
Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 63–64 (1988). 
 26. See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930) (“A legislature 
certainly has no intention whatever in connection with words which some two or three men drafted, 
which a considerable number rejected, and in regard to which many of the approving majority might 
have had, and often demonstrably did have, different ideas and beliefs.”). 
 27. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 310 n.1 
(Little, Brown and Co. 1891) (1833).  Story was attacking two canons of construction that Jefferson had 
recommended for constitutional interpretation. 
 28. See Scalia, supra note 11, at 32 (“[W]ith respect to 99.99 percent of the issues of construction 
reaching the courts, there is no legislative intent, so that any clues provided by the legislative history are 
bound to be false.  Those issues almost invariably involve points of relative detail, compared with the 
major sweep of the statute in question.  That a majority of both houses of Congress (never mind the 
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the point with insights imported from public choice theory, such as Kenneth 
Arrow’s theorem concerning the aggregation of group preferences.29  According to 
Arrow, although transitivity is generally considered an essential component of 
rational choice, given certain apparently reasonable conditions a multi-member 
body choosing from among three or more options will be unable to arrive at a 
transitive set of preferences (it may prefer A to B to C to A . . .).30  Because the 
ordering of group preferences is intransitive, if members are allowed continually to 
challenge the preceding vote, the legislature will cycle endlessly between the 
alternatives until it is stopped arbitrarily by, for example, fatigue or agenda 
control.31  Easterbrook concludes that “[b]ecause legislatures comprise many 
members, they do not have ‘intents’ or ‘designs,’ hidden yet discoverable.  Each 
member may or may not have a design.  The body as a whole, however, has only 
outcomes.”32  The text of the statute is the only aggregation of congressional 
preferences we have: attempting to recreate some “legislative intent” underlying 
the text is ultimately chimerical.   
Although this argument has done yeoman’s work in support of textualist 
theory, it is subject to several powerful rejoinders.  First, the conditions necessary 
to make the theorem work often may not be met.33  Second, as Professor Manning 
notes, even if collective intent is an empty concept, the use of legislative history 
might be justified in terms of delegation.34  Third, it is not clear that the idea of 
collective intent is as bankrupt as textualists like Easterbrook have suggested.  As 
Judge Posner has argued, “it is possible to overdo one’s skepticism in this regard.  
Institutions act purposively, therefore they have purposes.  A document can 
manifest a single purpose even though those who drafted and approved it had a 
                                                                                                     
President, if he signed rather than vetoed the bill) ever entertained any view with regard to such issues is 
utterly beyond belief.”). 
 29. See Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 547; Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in 
Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 61, 68 (1994). 
 30. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2nd ed., 1963) 
(suggesting that group preferences are often intransitive); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They” 
Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 241–44 (1992) (using 
Arrow’s theorem to argue that the idea of legislative intent is meaningless); see also Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982). 
 31. See Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 547 (stating “[e]very system of voting has flaws.  The one 
used by legislatures is particularly dependent on the order in which decisions are made.”). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION 47–55 (1991). 
 34. See Manning, supra note 14, at 690–91.  Manning explains that,  
[P]ositivist theories of interpretation suggest that ‘legislative intent’ has little to do with 
the genuine intentions of legislators, and much to do with legislators’ intentions to enact 
statutes that will be interpreted according to accepted interpretive conventions.  That 
basic understanding of interpretive reality, which textualists ultimately share, leaves 
ample room for the claim that courts rely on legislative history not because it reflects 
actual intent, but because legislators now expect their ambiguities to be resolved 
according to its lights.  If that is the case, then one might argue that Congress implicitly 
delegates law elaboration authority to committees and sponsors, when it enacts an 
ambiguous statute accompanied by a committee’s or sponsor’s explanation of its 
meaning. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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variety of private motives and expectations.”35  We speak all the time about 
collectives—such as clubs, corporations, armies, or even whole nations—as 
intentionally or purposively pursuing certain goals or projects, some of them quite 
specific and detailed.  The concept of group intent, then, doesn’t seem to be 
entirely empty. 
Finally, Arrovian intransitivity and Condorcetian circles36 may make us 
question whether committee reports reflect a genuine group ordering of 
preferences, but they do so at the cost of making all collective choices seem 
irrational, including the choice of statutory text.37  If, as I shall argue in Part IV, 
authority is generally a matter of epistemic deference—following the value 
choices38 made by agents we have reason to believe are capable of coming to a 
more accurate or more robust understanding of moral reality than we—then it is 
hard to see why we should obey this type of Congress at all: indeed, it is hard to see 
how any form of government other than monarchy is possible (or at least 
attractive).  Intent-skeptical arguments are designed to show the undesirability of 
recourse to legislative history, but these arguments are themselves, in a way, 
undesirable: they seem to lead to a general weakening of the moral authority of the 
law itself.   
But if intent skepticism begins to look less than compelling—or even 
undesirable—does the appeal of textualism begin to vanish as well?  The short 
answer is “no”: not all justifications for textualism are based on skepticism about 
legislative intent.  Textualists have offered a number of non-intent-skeptical 
arguments for the textualist approach; these arguments urge that, even if the 
concept of legislative intent is meaningful in some minimal sense, there are good 
reasons to “stick close to the surface meaning of texts,”39 gleaning what we can 
about what the legislature intended from the text and structure of the law in front of 
us.  Professor Manning has offered one such argument, and later I will offer a non-
skeptical argument of my own, built up from the parts of existing textualist theory I 
find the most compelling.40  For the present, what we have said about intent-
skeptical and non-skeptical justifications of textualism is enough to illustrate a 
central divide within textualist theory.  With this sketch of the terrain in hand, let us 
                                                                                                     
 35. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the 
Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 195–96 (1986); accord Joseph Raz, Intention in 
Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 263 (Robert P. George 
ed., 1996) (“We find no problem in attributing intentions to corporations, groups, and institutions in 
ordinary life . . . .”).  
 36. The endless cycling of group preferences that results from the intransitivity predicted by Arrow, 
see supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text, is often referred to as a “Condorcet circle” because it was 
first described by the 18th-century thinker Marquis de Condorcet in his book ESSAI SUR L’APPLICATION 
DE L’ANALYSE À LA PROBABILITÉ DES DÉCISIONS RENDUES À LA PLURALITÉ DES VOIX (1775). 
 37. Including, as Farber and Frickey urge (and Easterbrook himself acknowledges), choices made 
by courts.  FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 33, at 55.  See also Easterbrook, supra note 30. 
 38. Laws do more than express brute value choices, of course—they create causes of action, they 
allocate funds, they set up institutions, etc.  Because most of these actions crucially involve choices 
between values, however, I shall use the term “value choice” as shorthand for the legally operative 
content, of any type, expressed by legislation. 
 39. VERMEULE, supra note 14, at 73. 
 40. See infra Part IV and notes 95-104 for a discussion of Professor Manning’s argument for 
textualism; see infra Part IV and notes 162-79 for a sketch of my own argument.  
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return to the problem of scrivener’s error and see what implications it might have 
for this foundational debate over skepticism, as well as for the appeal of textualism 
generally. 
III.  THE PROBLEM OF SCRIVENER’S ERROR: THRUSTS AND PARRIES 
A.  The Challenge 
In this article’s introduction, I mentioned three cases involving statutes that 
contained scrivener’s errors: the Ohio statute that abolished public health officers, 
the Louisiana statute that allowed unlawful impeachment of witness testimony, and 
the Arkansas statute that made the trial transcript authoritative until approved by 
the Chancellor.  Let me give two further examples to help highlight the problem 
that scrivener’s error poses for any theory of statutory interpretation. 
The 1874 case Maxwell v. State41 dealt with a Maryland statute that provided 
for “the general valuation and assessment of property in this state.”42  The statute 
was long and complex, and there were problems from the very beginning.  Section 
One of the statute evidently intended to provide that all property was subject to 
taxation, except for property falling within eighteen classes of exceptions.  That 
this was the legislature’s intention was apparent from the summaries in the 
margins, which stated: “Property of all kinds shall be taxed” next to the opening 
clause and “Exempt” next to the following eighteen clauses.43  Further, the classes 
of exempt property included categories of property that one would expect to be 
exempt from taxation, such as “property belonging . . . to houses for public 
worship”; “all graveyards, cemeteries, and burying-grounds”; and “public 
hospitals, asylums and other incorporated literary, charitable or benevolent 
institutions for the relief of the indigent or afflicted.”44   
The problem was with the text of the bill, which provided that “all property 
real, personal and mixed, of all kinds and descriptions whatever in this State”—
except property in the eighteen classes of exceptions—“shall be exempt from 
taxation for State or local purposes.”45  So the act, on its face, made all real 
property exempt from taxation, except for the property in the eighteen classes 
belonging to charities, churches, and the like.  Something had gone terribly wrong, 
it seemed; surely the Maryland legislature meant to say that all property except 
property belonging to one of the exceptions shall be subject to taxation.  The 
Maryland Court of Appeals, in Maxwell, while acknowledging that it felt “quite 
sure [that] the Legislature intended to say something very different,”46 dutifully 
followed the plain meaning rule47 and held that the act meant what it said, making 
it unconstitutional48 under Article Fifteen of Maryland’s Declaration of Rights, 
                                                                                                     
 41. 40 Md. 273 (Md. 1874). 
 42. Act of Apr. 11, 1874, ch. 514, 1874 Md. 853. 
 43. Id. § 1. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Maxwell, 40 Md. at 292.  
 47. See id. at 291–94. 
 48. See id. at 294. 
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which stated that “every . . . person in the State . . . ought to contribute his 
proportion of public taxes . .  . .”49 
My second example centers around 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), which classifies 
certain offenses as “aggravated felonies” for purposes of deportation or 
immigration.  Subparagraphs F and G of paragraph 43 define the term “aggravated 
felony” to include “a crime of violence . . . for which the term of imprisonment at 
least one year” and “a theft offense . . . or burglary offense for which the term of 
imprisonment at least one year.”50  As several courts have noted, both 
subparagraphs are “obviously missing a crucial verb,”51 but no court has had 
difficulty in concluding that the missing verb, probably an “is,” is merely a 
“drafting snafu” that poses no constitutional problems.52 
This second example points up the problem for textualism most starkly, 
because here it is quite impossible to interpret subparagraphs F and G according to 
their “surface meaning.”  If textualism draws the meaning of a statutory text from 
the words alone, understood as a reasonable person would understand them in 
context, then that enterprise seems impossible for these provisions.  They are, 
simply put, unmeaning.  They are syntactically deviant, like Chomsky’s “colorless 
green ideas sleep furiously.”53  The reasonable reader is unable to draw any 
meaning out of them whatsoever.   
Textualism’s standard methodology for interpreting statutory text fails in the 
case of errors that result in deviances like missing verbs.  If textualism asks judges 
to apply its standard methodology to these cases, it will be incoherent; if it simply 
ignores these cases, it will be incomplete, since it will have failed to specify an 
interpretive method for every type of statutory text that courts will foreseeably be 
called upon to interpret.  To be a complete and coherent account of statutory 
interpretation, textualism needs to provide some method for dealing with these 
cases other than its standard method, even if this method is nothing more than 
Judge Bork’s “ink blot” strategy of acting as if inscrutable text had never been 
enacted.54  
Where the error results not in an unmeaning text but in a text with a very 
unlikely meaning, the challenge posed to textualism is less brazen but still 
compelling.  A textualist judge can certainly interpret a statute as exempting all 
property from taxes based on its plain meaning, as the court in Maxwell did, even 
though the statute is obviously meant to impose a tax.  There is no gap in the 
textualist methodology, here, but even the most stout-hearted textualist is likely to 
feel a little queasy.   
The source of this queasiness, I think, is that textualists see themselves as 
faithful agents of the legislature and it is obvious that the legislature meant 
                                                                                                     
 49. MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XV (1864). 
 50. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (F) & (G) (2006). 
 51. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 790 (3rd Cir. 1999).  
 52. See United States v. Banda-Zamora, 178 F.3d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 1999).  Accord Graham, 169 
F.3d at 790–91; United States v. Pancheo, 225 F.3d 148, 153–54 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Maldonado-Ramirez, 216 F.3d 940, 943–44 (11th Cir. 2000).  
 53. NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES 15 (1968). 
 54. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 
166 (1990). 
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something else, here.  If, as I shall suggest a little later, legislative supremacy, like 
much authority, is a case of epistemic deference,55 then it makes little sense to defer 
to a choice that the legislature so clearly did not intend to make.  Deferring to the 
considered value choices of the legislature when those choices have emerged from 
a legislative process designed to insure openness, mutual compromise, and 
deliberation seems perfectly reasonable.  Ordinarily, I will argue, the single best 
place to look for these choices is the text of the statute.56  But when the choice 
embedded in the statute is one that the legislature clearly did not intend to make 
and it is clear which contrary choice the legislature did intend to make, following 
the text does not make one the legislature’s faithful agent. 
Moreover, the costs of strictly following the standard methodology can be 
quite vivid.  The costs of striking down a tax statute as unconstitutional because of 
a scrivener’s error are very real: the state will be forced to forgo this revenue until 
the legislature corrects the statute (a correction which, of course, also entails certain 
costs).  We can certainly imagine errors that would cause much higher costs.  More 
to the point, these costs are being imposed for reasons that seem easily avoidable: 
when it is clear what Congress actually intended to write, the fix seems painless 
enough.57  An interpretive theory that fails to provide for the correction of 
                                                                                                     
 55. See infra notes 151–153 and accompanying text. 
 56. See infra notes 178–181 and accompanying text. 
 57. Professor Nagle, in a thoughtful article, has disputed this point.  See John Nagle, Textualism’s 
Exceptions, 15 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1 (2002), available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/ 
art15 [hereinafter Nagle, Textualism’s Exceptions]; see generally John Copeland Nagle, Corrections 
Day, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1267 (1996).  Nagle argues that the costs of the scrivener’s error exception to 
the plain meaning rule (and, relatedly, of the absurdity doctrine) outweigh the benefits.  Nagle gives 
three types of costs associated with the exceptions, which “(1) conflict with the theoretical argument for 
textualism; (2) undermine the need for, and likelihood of, legislative correction of statutory mistakes; 
and (3) encourage claims of absurdity and drafting error that consume the precious time and other 
resources of judges, attorneys, and litigants alike.”  Nagle, Textualism’s Exceptions, at 2.  Category (1) 
clearly assumes that the scrivener’s error doctrine is in theoretical conflict with textualism; it is the 
burden of this article to argue the contrary.  The cost represented by category (3) is fairly trivial and is 
unlikely to hold up its end if correcting scrivener’s error turns out to be even mildly beneficial.  By 
analogy, surely Nagle wouldn’t attack the “self-defense” affirmative defense to battery on the ground 
that litigants and courts end up wasting their time arguing whether or not the defendant was acting in 
self-defense.   
Category (2) costs pose a more difficult problem.  Nagle’s argument here is similar to the fear 
that judicial review will dampen Congress’ incentive to pass only constitutional statutes—a 
phenomenon that Adrian Vermeule aptly has called “a form of moral hazard.”  VERMEULE, supra note 
14, at 261.  This also goes to Nagle’s benefits estimate:  he argues that the usefulness of judicial error 
correction is limited, since other institutional actors can correct the errors instead.  Nagle, Textualism’s 
Exceptions, at 8–12.  Three observations seem in order, here.  First, I am not entirely sure that legislative 
apathy will be the necessary consequence of the continued correction of scrivener’s errors.  While 
knowledge that courts are in the error-correcting business could conceivably make Congress less 
interested in the activity, it is also plausible that fear of courts mistaking its true intentions might make 
Congress more interested in supervising the activity.  Second, it’s not clear that more judicial and less 
legislative correction of errors is categorically undesirable.  To be sure, if all scrivener’s errors are 
considered as a class, Congress is probably the more-efficient error corrector, since it is plausibly in the 
best position to determine whether it made a drafting error.  Some errors, however, are relatively easily 
and conclusively discovered.  Below, I advocate restricting permissible judicial correction of scrivener’s 
errors to these cases, where the evidence of error is near-conclusive.  For this class of errors, the 
judiciary might well be the most-efficient error corrector.  The optimal approach might be some sort of 
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scrivener’s errors like the one in Maxwell is, I think, pro tanto less desirable than 
one that does so provide. 
If textualists are unable to articulate a theory of scrivener’s error compatible 
with textualism, then, textualism itself may seem undesirable at best and incoherent 
or incomplete at worst.  Moreover, if only some justifications for textualism are 
compatible with a satisfactory solution to the scrivener’s error problem, this 
constitutes a reason for favoring these justifications over the justifications that are 
not able to accommodate a solution to the problem.  Before we reach this point, 
though, we need to see if textualism is actually compatible with an answer to the 
problem of scrivener’s error.  As a first cut at determining this, I briefly survey the 
existing textualist solutions to the scrivener’s error problem.  I conclude that each 
of these existing solutions is unsatisfactory and go on to articulate my own 
solution, which aspires to build on the successes of the existing approaches while 
avoiding their failings. 
B.  Existing Textualist Approaches: Review and Critique 
Before reviewing the existing textualist approaches to scrivener’s error, I pause 
to emphasize a point that came out in the discussion above: textualists see 
themselves as operating within the confines of the faithful agent approach.  Later, I 
will argue that there are good reasons for this, reasons that stem from the moral 
authority of law itself.58  For now, it should be sufficient to note that textualists 
have traditionally seen themselves as operating within the faithful agent paradigm59 
and that a fair reading of the text, structure, and history of the Constitution would 
seem to be compatible with the faithful agent theory.60 
                                                                                                     
division of labor between the judicial and legislative branches.  Third, Nagle’s institutional point is 
subject to an institutional counterpoint.  Even assuming that concerted judicial refusal to correct drafting 
errors would result in greater congressional error-correction and that this would be a good thing, an 
individual judge, faced with an uncorrected scrivener’s error, does not have the power to effect the type 
of concerted judicial action necessary to bring this benefit about.  The benefit that might result if all 
judges refused to correct errors is not “marginal and divisible,” VERMEULE, supra note 14, at 118–32, 
261–62, in such a way that an individual judge’s choice not to correct would bring about any portion of 
this benefit.  For an individual judge, the decision is between correcting this error or declining to do so.  
On the benefits side, Nagle asserts that the scrivener’s error exception is employed in very few 
cases, but he comes to this conclusion by looking only at those scrivener’s errors that current textualists 
would correct.  Nagle, Textualism’s Exceptions, at 5–6.  To the extent that the underlying argument is 
over whether existing textualist theory justifies correction of scrivener’s errors either too seldom or too 
frequently, there is something circular about basing a benefits estimate on the current practice of 
textualist judges in this respect.  Finally, if the central argument of this article is correct, Nagle ignores 
the most important benefit of all: when textualists fail to correct a scrivener’s error, they are failing to 
defer to the actual value choices of the legislature.  On the premises of the faithful agent theory, 
eliminating this failure would result in a superior allocation of epistemic deference and therefore would 
be a substantial benefit. 
 58. See infra Part IV.A. 
 59. See Manning, supra note 22, at 95–96;  
 60. Compare John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(2001) (arguing that the faithful agent theory is mandated by the structure and history of the 
Constitution), with William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial 
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990 (2001) (arguing that the 
history of the Constitution condones a more eclectic, cooperative approach to statutory interpretation). 
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For a textualist approach to scrivener’s error to be textualist, then, it must 
operate within the confines of the faithful agent theory.  I emphasize this now 
because, as the following discussion of the purportedly textualist approaches to 
scrivener’s error will show, the reasons one might advance for correcting a 
scrivener’s error can usefully be separated into two categories: fidelity-based and 
non-fidelity-based.  A fidelity-based reason argues that a scrivener’s error should 
be corrected because enforcing the statute as corrected better carries out the intent 
of the legislature.  So, for example, the court in Maxwell might have argued that the 
tax statute should be read, contrary to the surface meaning of the text, as exempting 
only specific categories of property, such as property owned by charities, from 
taxation, because correcting this error better effectuates the choices that the 
legislature meant to make.   
On the other hand, non-fidelity-based reasons argue that a scrivener’s error 
should be corrected because this advances some other goal not tethered to the 
legislature’s intent.  So the Maxwell court might also have argued that the error 
should be corrected because exempting all property from taxation, except for 
property falling within one of the eighteen exceptions, is an absurdity of 
constitutional proportions.  If it had taken this tack, the court would have corrected 
the error not because it was acting as the legislature’s faithful agent but because it 
was enforcing higher, constitutional law. 
At first blush, one might expect that textualists could offer only fidelity-based 
reasons if they wanted to remain within the faithful agent paradigm, but this is not 
quite so.  To see this, one need only recognize that textualists accept the validity of 
judicial review.  Judicial review is most emphatically not based on fidelity to the 
legislative will, but some acceptance of judicial review is seen as compatible with 
the faithful agent theory.  So some deviation from the legislature’s will—some 
acceptance of non-fidelity-based reasons for decision—is acceptable within the 
faithful agent theory.  The difficulty is to discern what exactly the minimum 
content of the faithful agent theory is. 
1.  Manning 
A good place to start the exploration of this problem is Professor Manning’s 
approach to scrivener’s error.  Manning has not offered any systematic theory of 
scrivener’s error, but in a lengthy footnote to his article on the absurdity doctrine he 
provides a few notes towards such a theory.61  To get a grasp on Manning’s 
approach to scrivener’s error, we need to begin by examining his criticism of the 
absurdity doctrine.  First, Manning examines the absurdity doctrine as “a form of 
strong intentionalism”62 and argues that it should be abandoned for the familiar 
textualist reasons for resisting intentionalism: intent skepticism63 and process 
concerns.64   
But Manning goes on to write that “the absurdity doctrine’s legitimacy might 
                                                                                                     
 61. See Manning, supra note 10, at 2459 n.265. 
 62. Id. at 2420. 
 63. Id. at 2408–31; see also supra notes 26–40 and accompanying text. 
 64. Manning, supra note 10, at 2431–46; see also infra notes 162–173 and accompanying text. 
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rest on grounds other than legislative intent.”65  Specifically, “when judges invoke 
the absurdity doctrine to avoid an unreasonable result, one might ascribe their 
behavior to judicial power to ‘enrich positive law with the moral values and 
practical concerns of a civilized society,’ even when such action requires displacing 
clear statutory outcomes.”66  This justification cannot be parried by the textualists’ 
traditional tool-kit of anti-intent arguments; it must be countered by resort to “the 
institutional allocation of power among the branches” of federal government.67  In 
other words, justifying the absurdity doctrine in terms of judicial power implicates 
the scope of the faithful agent theory. 
After reviewing the original and contemporary understanding of the 
constitutional structure, Manning’s conclusion is that this structure embodies “a 
conception of limited judicial power that is quite difficult to square with the 
absurdity doctrine’s assumptions.”68  Original understanding of “the separation of 
legislative and judicial powers reflects a rule-of-law tradition that rejects ad hoc 
alterations of clear and general laws,” and “the core of the post-New Deal 
constitutional order” is that “when legislation does not implicate suspect 
classifications or fundamental rights, the default constitutional standard of 
rationality review instructs courts to respect the often-awkward lines of legislative 
compromise drawn by duly enacted statutes.”69 
Central to the faithful agent theory is the judiciary’s duty to suppress its own 
all-things-considered judgment of the best disposition of the case at bar in 
deference to the highest valid law on point.  Where that law is the Constitution, 
judges enforcing constitutionally entrenched value choices are acting as faithful 
agents of the constitutional order, and where that law is a federal statute, the judges 
should act as faithful agents of Congress.  But where judges abandon Congress’s 
value choices in favor of their own ideas of the good, the right, or the reasonable, 
they are operating outside the faithful agent theory altogether.  The gravamen of 
Manning’s critique of the absurdity doctrine, then, is that where that doctrine is 
justified in terms of judicial power, it runs contrary to the faithful agent theory, and 
where it is justified—within the faithful agent paradigm—in terms of legislative 
intent, it runs contrary to the traditional textualist arguments against strong 
intentionalism. 
Manning takes pains, however, to differentiate the absurdity doctrine from the 
correction of scrivener’s errors; in so doing, he articulates three exemplary types of 
errors which he suggests may be properly correctable: cross-reference errors, where 
Congress uses a cross-reference “that, in context, could refer only to a nearby 
section other than the one actually named”; the use of a particular word that 
“simply [does] not make linguistic sense in the context of the sentence as a whole”; 
and “common mistake[s] of grammar or punctuation that make[] linguistic 
nonsense of an otherwise comprehensible sentence.”70  Manning’s impulse to 
                                                                                                     
 65. Manning, supra note 10, at 2431–32. 
 66. Id. at 2432 (quoting United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1335 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., 
dissenting)). 
 67. Id. at 2432–33. 
 68. Id. at 2433 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 2459 n.265. 
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differentiate the problem of scrivener’s error from the absurdity doctrine is 
laudable; indeed, I largely accept his critique of the absurdity doctrine and agree 
that any viable textualist approach to scrivener’s errors must be able to differentiate 
itself from the absurdity doctrine or fall prey to the criticism of being outside the 
bounds of the faithful agent theory.  That said, I think that Manning’s own attempt 
at differentiating the two is ultimately inconsistent with other strands of his 
thought.   
Begin with Manning’s three exemplary types of correctable errors.  The first 
type, cross-reference errors, should be ignored, because this type of error is 
reductive: a mistaken cross reference is not an independent type of error; if 
Congress references the wrong section of an act, the result may be an error—in 
fact, the mistaken reference may make the provision unmeaning.  But the mistaken 
reference is only an error because of this erroneous result.  Take, for example, 18 
U.S.C. § 3565(b)(3), which requires courts to revoke probation and resentence a 
defendant to imprisonment if “the defendant . . . refuses to comply with drug 
testing, thereby violating the condition imposed by section 3563(a)(4).”71  But 
§ 3563(a)(4) reads, “The court shall provide, as an explicit condition of a sentence 
of probation . . . for a domestic violence crime . . . that the defendant attend a 
public, private, or private nonprofit offender rehabilitation program.”72 
Section 3565(b)(3) deals with defendants who fail to comply with drug testing 
but references a paragraph of the code dealing with domestic violence crimes.  
Next-door to § 3563(a)(4), however, is paragraph 5 of § 3563(a), which reads, 
“[T]he court shall provide, as an explicit condition of a sentence of probation . . . 
for a felony, a misdemeanor, or an infraction, that the defendant refrain from any 
unlawful use of a controlled substance and submit to one drug test within 15 days 
of release on probation and at least 2 periodic drug tests thereafter.”73  It seems far 
more likely that Congress meant for § 3565(b)(3) to reference paragraph 5, rather 
than paragraph 4, and simply made a reference error.74  But the point is that this 
mistaken reference to paragraph 4 instead of paragraph 5 is mistaken because it 
results in § 3565(b)(3)’s revocation of parole for drug-test evaders who also fail to 
attend a court-ordered rehabilitation program for domestic violence offenders; it is 
not mistaken because § 3565(b)(3) references § 3563(a)(4) rather than § 
3563(a)(5), in and of itself.  Reference errors are only errors if they result in 
substantive errors.  
Manning’s other two examples of correctable scrivener’s errors—word usage 
and grammar errors that result in linguistic nonsense—are both errors that result in 
a syntactically deviant text: like the omission of a crucial verb in 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1101(a)(43)(F) & (G), discussed above.75  Manning’s stated justification for 
distinguishing between the absurdity doctrine and errors like these is that, while 
correcting purported absurdities threatens to undo implicit legislative 
                                                                                                     
 71. 18 U.S.C. § 3565(b)(3) (2006). 
 72. Id. § 3563(a)(4). 
 73. Id. § 3563(a)(5). 
 74. See United States v. Coatoam, 245 F.3d 553, 555 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that § 3565(b)(3) 
meant to refer to § 3563(a)(5)); accord United States v. Paul, 542 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2008) (same).  
 75. Supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. 
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compromises,76 “there is only the remotest possibility that any such clerical mistake 
reflected a deliberate legislative compromise.”77  This seems to be a fidelity-based 
reason for error-correction: if it is clear that the wording of a provision is 
unintended, and doesn’t represent a deliberate compromise, then courts should feel 
free to correct it. 
But shouldn’t this apply to non-deviant errors as well?  If it is clear that the 
legislature meant for witness testimony to be impeached in lawful, rather than 
unlawful ways, shouldn’t the court enforce this corrected reading of the statute 
despite the fact that allowing impeachment “in any unlawful way”78 is not strictly 
unmeaning so long as it is clear that the wording was unintentional, and did not 
reflect a deliberate compromise?  Manning might respond that we can only be sure 
that an implicit compromise isn’t involved when the error does result in a deviant 
text.  But this seems to confuse an evidentiary concern with the conceptual 
distinction between scrivener’s error and absurdity.  The conceptual question of 
whether there is theoretical room for a doctrine of scrivener’s error separate from 
the absurdity doctrine must be distinguished from the evidentiary question of how 
we know when we’re confronted by a scrivener’s error.79  When the text of a 
statute is deviant, it is abundantly clear that the value choice Congress intended to 
make is not expressed by the surface meaning of the text, since nothing 
comprehensible whatsoever is expressed by the surface meaning of the text.  
Manning recognizes this.  But sometimes we can be sure that non-deviant texts 
contain scrivener’s errors, too, by looking at the legislative history.  
A good example is 49 U.S.C. § 14704, which provides relief for certain 
violations by interstate carriers.  Subsection (a)(2) deals with carrier violations of 
applicable regulations, providing that carriers shall be “liable for damages 
sustained by a person as a result of an act or omission” that violates certain 
regulations.80  It is clear that parties aggrieved by a violation of these regulations 
can bring an administrative complaint to either the Secretary of Transportation or 
the Surface Transportation Board,81 and courts have also interpreted this subsection 
as creating a private right of action.82  Subsection (b), on the other hand, addresses 
certain instances of carrier overcharging, providing that “[a] carrier . . . is liable to a 
person for amounts charged that exceed the applicable rate for transportation or 
service,”83 if that applicable rate is in effect under § 13702, which provides that 
certain carriers, such as carriers that transport household goods, must file their rates 
with the Board.84  And subsection (c) establishes that a party can elect to pursue an 
                                                                                                     
 76. See Manning, supra note 10, at 2421–31. 
 77. Id. at 2459 n. 265. 
 78. Scurto v. Le Blanc, 184 So. 567, 574 (La. 1938). 
 79. Cf. infra notes 234–35 and accompanying text. 
 80. 49 U.S.C. § 14704(a)(2) (2006). 
 81. Id. § 14701. 
 82. See Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. New Prime, Inc., 192 F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 1999); 
James C. Sullivan, Private Rights of Action to Enforce the Truth-In-Leasing Regulations in Court, 32 
TRANSP. L.J. 159, (2005).  If a plaintiff elects to pursue § 14701’s administrative remedy, subsection 
(b)(1) also provides a private right of action to enforce a final order issued by the Secretary or Board. 
 83. 49 U.S.C. § 14704(b). 
 84. Id. § 13702. 
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action for overcharges under subsection (b) either by way of civil action or 
administrative complaint.85   
Section 14705 deals with limitation periods for these actions.  Subsection (b) 
provides an 18-month limitation period for “civil action[s] to recover overcharges,” 
and a three-year limitation for administrative complaints regarding overcharges.86  
Subsection (c) provides that “[a] person must file a[n administrative] complaint . . . 
to recover damages under section 14704(b) within 2 years after the claim 
accrues.”87  But § 14704(b) also deals with overcharges.  So subsection (b) of 
Section 14705 gives a limitation period of 3 years for administrative actions to 
recover overcharges, and subsection (c) provides that administrative complaints 
regarding overcharges under § 14704(b) must be filed within 2 years. 
This scheme is not contradictory.  As at least one court has noted, § 14705(b)’s 
limitation period presumably covers administrative actions regarding all 
overcharges, not just the overcharges—in violation of § 13702—covered by § 
14704(b).88  So the effect of § 14705(b) and (c) is to provide a 3-year limitation 
period for most administrative overcharge actions but a 2-year period for actions 
regarding overcharges in violation of § 13702.  Although not contradictory, this 
result seems a little odd, especially considering that no provision of § 14705 
provides a limitation period for § 14704(a)(2), the provision dealing with carrier 
violations of regulations, leaving that provision to be governed by the default 4-
year limitation period from 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a).89  Legislative history provides an 
explanation.  The clause dealing with carrier violations of regulations, now our § 
14704(a)(2), was originally placed in § 14704(b)(2), in both the House and Senate 
bills.90  As part of subsection (b), this clause would have been subject to 
§14705(c)’s two-year statute of limitations.91  But shortly before the bill came to 
the floor, the House amended its bill to make a number of changes, including 
moving the language allowing non-overcharge damages from (b)(2) to (a)(2).92  
After conference committee, the House’s numbering of this clause was adopted, 
apparently without realizing that the renumbering had affected the applicable 
statute of limitations.93  The Surface Transportation Board itself has recognized that 
                                                                                                     
 85. Id. § 14704(c). 
 86. Id. § 14705(b). 
 87. Id. § 14705(c). 
 88. See Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. United Van Lines, 556 F.3d 690, 695 (8th Cir. 
2009).  Moreover, it is possible that Congress intended to draw a distinction between actions for 
overcharges, covered by § 14705(b), and actions for damages for exceeding the tariff rate, covered by 
(c).  Compare Davis v. Portland Seed Co., 264 U.S. 403, 420 (1924) (drawing a distinction between 
overcharges and damages), with United Van Lines, 556 F.3d at 694–95 (suggesting that such a 
distinction is no longer relevant). 
 89. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) (2006) (“Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under 
an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section may not be commenced later 
than 4 years after the cause of action accrues.”). 
 90. See Sullivan, supra note 82, at 167–70. 
 91. Even though § 14705(c)’s limitation period applies, by its terms, to “a complaint with the Board 
or Secretary,” some courts have interpreted this language as extending to civil actions.  See Fitzpatrick 
v. Morgan S., Inc., 261 F.Supp.2d 978, 984 n.5 (W.D. Tenn. 2003). 
 92. Fitzpatrick, 261 F.Supp.2d at 983.  
 93. Id.   
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the numbering problem is merely a “technical error.”94 
In cases like this, the text that results from the error is non-deviant, but it is 
nevertheless clear from the legislative history that there has been an error—that the 
curious text does not reflect an implicit legislative compromise.  But if Manning’s 
justification for allowing correction of scrivener’s errors is that they clearly do not 
reflect deliberate compromises, he should be willing to correct an error clearly 
indicated by the legislative history, unless he is unwilling to allow judges to consult 
legislative history to discover an error on some collateral ground.   
Manning might hold legislative history unreliable for the purposes of 
establishing the existence of a scrivener’s error, for example, for the same reasons 
that textualists find legislative history unreliable generally.  In Part II, we saw that 
these reasons could be divided into two categories: intent-skeptical and non-intent-
skeptical.95  I will argue at greater length in Part IV that the best non-skeptical 
arguments for textualism are compatible with consulting legislative history to 
determine whether a scrivener’s error has occurred.96  More importantly for present 
purposes, Manning’s own argument against consulting legislative history generally 
does not apply to this particular use of legislative history.  To see why, we need to 
take a closer look at Professor Manning’s justification for textualism. 
While important strands of Manning’s thought are intent-skeptical,97 
Manning’s core arguments for textualism are non-skeptical.  For example, 
Manning’s argument against Hart-and-Sacks-style purposivism rests not on an 
argument that legislatures just cannot have purposes but instead on concern for 
bicameralism and presentment, emphasizing the power these procedural protections 
give to minorities to stop legislation or demand legislative compromises.98  “Giving 
precedence to semantic context (when clear),” Manning writes, “is necessary to 
enable legislators to set the level of generality at which they wish to express their 
policies.  In turn, this ability alone permits them to strike compromises that go so 
far and no farther.”99 
Manning’s argument against the use of legislative history is also non-skeptical.  
He argues that by giving dispositive weight to legislative history, judges allow 
Congress to delegate the power to resolve statutory indeterminacy—effectively, the 
power to create law—to agents who act outside Article I’s bicameralism and 
presentment requirements,100 constituting an unconstitutional legislative self-
delegation.101 
This argument has at least two advantages over the simpler but less-articulated 
textualist contention that “[w]e are governed by laws, not by the intentions of 
legislators.”102  First, by suggesting that judges can properly interpret only by 
                                                                                                     
 94. Nat’l Ass’n of Freight Transp. Consultants, 61 Fed. Reg. 60140, 60141 n.3 (Nov. 26, 1996) 
(declaratory order proceeding). 
 95. Supra notes 23–40 and accompanying text. 
 96. Infra Part IV.B. 
 97. See infra notes 110–116 and accompanying text. 
 98. See Manning, supra note 22, at 103–09; Manning, supra note 10, at 2437–38. 
 99. Manning, supra note 22, at 99. 
 100. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 101. See Manning, supra note 14, at 695–731. 
 102. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993). 
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looking at the text, textualists lay themselves open to the charge of inconsistency: 
after all, textualists themselves look at sources external to the text of the law, such 
as dictionaries, cannons of construction, and other laws.103  Indeed, unless they 
intend to abandon the central teaching of philosophy of language, at least since 
Wittgenstein first proclaimed that “the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language,”104 that “language is intelligible by virtue of a community’s shared 
conventions for understanding words in context”105 in favor of the metaphysically 
implausible conceptualism of their formalist forbearers, it seems textualists must 
admit that no interpretation can go forward without looking outside the four corners 
of the text.  The argument from the nondelegation doctrine solves this problem by 
differentiating between external sources deemed permissible by textualists and 
legislative history.  Only consultation of the latter enables Congress to bypass the 
procedural protections of bicameralism and presentment. 
Second, the primitive assertion that only the text of the law can be 
authoritative leaves textualists open to the rejoinder that intentionalists don’t 
consider legislative history to be authoritative; they merely consider it one place to 
look, among others, in determining a provision’s meaning.106  Manning’s 
nondelegation argument bars this move by making any dispositive reliance on 
legislative history impermissible.  To see this, imagine that Congress, wishing to 
make value choice ε without going through bicameralism and presentment, leaves 
the statutory text indeterminate with respect to ε but embeds ε into the legislative 
history.  Bicameralism and presentment are circumvented whenever courts, 
interpreting the statutory text, impose ε rather than decline to impose it, based on 
the legislative history.  Courts need not treat the legislative history as 
“authoritative,” or on par with the text; Congress is enabled to evade bicameralism 
and presentment whenever the weight of the legislative history, no matter how 
trivial, is by itself the deciding factor in a court’s choice to impose ε.  
Manning’s nondelegation argument, then, is a powerful critique of the use of 
legislative history, not subject to many of the pitfalls of other similar but more 
primitive arguments.  But this argument simply doesn’t cut any ice against the use 
of legislative history to discover scrivener’s error.  Assuming that the legislative 
history demonstrates conclusively that Congress107 thought it was enacting value 
choice X when in fact it enacted a text that embodied choice X´, then choice X 
actually has survived the requisite procedural hurdles.  X´ is, ex hypothesi, a 
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mistake; disallowing the use of legislative history to show that this is so does not 
serve any process goals, since a consensus in favor of X already survived the 
process.108 
What about intent-skeptical arguments, then—do these bar the use of 
legislative history to demonstrate error?  The answer, I think, is yes, and this 
ultimately shows that Manning’s conceptual approach to scrivener’s error is 
inconsistent.  My claim is that fidelity-based reasons for correcting a scrivener’s 
error are incompatible with intent-skepticism.  Recall that a fidelity-based reason 
calls for correction of a clerical error because enforcing the text as corrected would 
better carry out legislative intent.  This requires belief in some fact-of-the-matter 
about legislative intent, no matter how thin, that lies behind the text of the statute.  
What else could it mean for the act of reading a statute against the text to be more 
in line with legislative intent than reading the statute according to the text?  But 
intent-skepticism just is the belief that there is no fact-of-the-matter about 
legislative intent separate from the enacted text. 
If this is so, what are the implications for Manning’s approach to scrivener’s 
error?  As I argued above,109 Manning’s most notable justifications for textualism 
are non-skeptical; these justifications, then, are not incompatible with a fidelity-
based approach to scrivener’s error.  But intent skepticism is nevertheless an 
important strand of Manning’s thought.  This is most apparent in his 2005 article 
Textualism and Legislative Intent.110  There he argues that “the only meaningful . . . 
legislative intentions are those reflected in the public meaning of the final statutory 
text.”111  Although “the textualists’ view of the legislative process . . . by no means 
necessitates a wholesale rejection of any useful conception of legislative intent,”112 
it does necessitate rejection of “perhaps the most important premise of classical 
intentionalism: the idea that behind most legislation lies some sort of policy 
judgment that is meaningfully identifiable, shared by a legislative majority, and yet 
imprecisely expressed in the public meaning of the text that has made its way 
through Congress’s many filters.”113 Textualists, “given their assumptions about 
the legislative process, necessarily believe that intent is a construct.”114  This 
“objectified intent”115 is to be gathered from “the import that a reasonable person 
conversant with applicable social and linguistic conventions would attach to the 
enacted words.”116 
But if this is so, if there is no “judgment that is meaningfully identifiable, 
                                                                                                     
 108. Manning might protest that the legislative history is strategic: a disingenuous attempt by a few 
legislators to make it look like a scrivener’s error has occurred.  Such an argument is ruled out for the 
purposes of the above hypothetical, since I have openly assumed away any concerns about the accuracy 
of the evidence of the error.  However, in practice, this may be a real concern.  For reasons to doubt that 
the concern is warranted for some common types of legislative history, see infra notes 219–221 and 
accompanying text. 
 109. See supra notes 97–106 and accompanying text. 
 110. John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419 (2005). 
 111. Id. at 424. 
 112. Id. at 432. 
 113. Id. at 438. 
 114. Id. at 423. 
 115. Scalia, supra note 11, at 17. 
 116. Manning, supra note 110, at 424. 
138 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1 
shared by a legislative majority, and yet imprecisely expressed in the public 
meaning of the text,”117 then why should we care if “there is only the remotest 
possibility” that a suspicious text “reflected a deliberate legislative 
compromise”?118  If there can be no meaningful conception of legislative intent that 
is not constructed from the text itself, the search for textual provisions that do not 
reflect genuine legislative intent just doesn’t make any sense.  Manning’s proffered 
justification for correcting scrivener’s errors, apparently fidelity-based, is at war 
with his views on the incomprehensibility of legislative intent.  And importantly, 
Manning’s conception of legislative intent not only undermines the use of 
legislative history to demonstrate the existence of scrivener’s errors, it undermines 
the correction of errors resulting in deviance, as well.  No matter how unlikely it 
may be that a deviant text reflects a deliberate legislative compromise, on 
Manning’s understanding of intent as a construct, this can only be beside the point, 
since there is nothing behind the text to appeal to. 
This may not leave Manning’s approach to scrivener’s error entirely 
unmoored.  Manning’s repeated emphasis on errors that make “linguistic nonsense 
of an otherwise comprehensible sentence”119 points the way towards an alternative 
justification for correction of scrivener’s errors, at least ones that result in deviant 
texts.  Correcting these deviant errors might be justified on the grounds that this is 
the minimum step necessary to make any sense whatsoever out of the text in 
question.  For example, consider the provision of the Iowa State Tort Claims Act at 
issue in Jones v. Iowa State Highway Comm’n.120  Section 25A.14 of that act 
exempted the State from any liability for “any claim arising out of assault, battery, 
false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse or process, libel, 
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.”121  In Jones, 
the plaintiffs conceded that they were bringing a claim for abuse of process, but 
argued that the statute, by its terms, did not exempt such claims.122  The court 
rejected this argument because “[t]he term ‘abuse of process’ has long been 
recognized as an actionable tort . . . .  On the other hand ‘abuse or process’ is 
meaningless in the context in which it appears in the section. If we were to 
recognize the literal language of the statute, we would be hard put to ascribe any 
sensible meaning to the words . . . .”123  
Along these lines, Manning might argue that the point isn’t that Congress 
cannot be assumed to have intended to enact a text that makes no sense but rather 
that no meaningful legal content at all can be drawn from the text unless the error is 
corrected.  Understood this way, the argument for correction is non-fidelity-based: 
the judge who corrects a statute in this way is not purporting to act more closely in 
line with legislative intent, he is imposing minimum conditions of meaningfulness 
on the legislature so as to serve the independent value of “mak[ing] sense rather 
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than nonsense out of the corpus juris.”124   
While this reason is non-fidelity-based,125 I don’t think it goes beyond the 
bounds of the faithful agent theory.  This is so because, on the textualist’s 
understanding of legislative intent as a construct built up from the text, there simply 
is no meaningful legislative intent present to be faithful to, if the text is 
incomprehensible.  This arguably separates scrivener’s error from statutory 
absurdities: while it would be incompatible with the faithful agent theory to 
interpret a text against the legislative intent constructed from the fair meaning of 
the text because it results in what the judge thinks is an absurdity, in the case of 
deviant texts there is no legislative intent present to defer to and the best the judge 
can do is either ignore the text outright or make the best sense out of it that she can.  
Where the fix is obvious and easy, correcting the text might be justified by 
important non-fidelity based values. 
The problem with this account of scrivener’s error is not that it is unfaithful to 
legislative supremacy but rather that it fails to satisfactorily solve the problem.  
Imposing minimum conditions of meaningfulness on statutory texts can at most 
justify the correction of deviant texts.  It cannot be used to justify correcting non-
deviant errors, like those in Maxwell, which mistakenly “exempted” most of the 
property in the state from taxation;126 Scurto, which authorized any “unlawful” 
impeachment of testimony;127 or Covington, which abolished the “officers” of 
municipal health boards.128  But this class of errors contains arguably the most 
significant and egregious errors we have encountered.  We have already seen that 
an account of statutory interpretation that cannot provide for the correction of these 
types of errors is for that reason less desirable than one that can.  If another 
textualist account of scrivener’s error is able to deal with non-deviant errors as well 
as deviant ones, it is, ceteris paribus, preferable to Manning’s. 
2.  Gold 
Running somewhat parallel to this second interpretation of Manning’s 
approach, Professor Andrew Gold has offered an alternative textualist account of 
scrivener’s error.  Taking off from the standard textualist search for objectified 
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intent, Gold argues that linguistic conventions “permit judges to conclude that an 
intended meaning exists without knowing what was actually intended.”129  But 
occasionally, when faced with “an outcome which is so unthinkable, or a word 
choice which is so clearly mistaken, that a literal interpretation of the statute’s 
words would deviate from the conventional understanding of the statutory 
language,” judges should follow this “conventional understanding” rather than the 
“literal interpretation.”130 
This is a strong theory; it covers more ground than Manning’s, authorizing 
correction of all errors resulting in deviant texts and some non-deviant errors that 
are patently absurd.  But the theory is able to cover this large class of errors 
because it is conceptually blunt: rather than drawing a line between unintended 
consequences and unintended texts, the theory dictates correction of scrivener’s 
errors only because they are a subclass of extreme absurdities.  Like Manning, 
therefore, Gold would not allow correction of texts which are facially non-absurd 
but which the legislative history indicates are mistakenly worded; and unlike 
Manning, Gold would allow limited use of the absurdity doctrine. 
The theory’s faliure to distinguish between scrivener’s errors and the absurdity 
doctrine may seem like reason enough to reject it.  Recall that above I endorsed 
Manning’s conclusion that the absurdity doctrine is inconsistent with the 
conjunction of the faithful agent theory and the rejection of strong 
intentionalism.131  But Gold’s approach to absurdity is unique; it purports to offer 
fidelity-based reasons for endorsing the absurdity doctrine (and the correction of 
scrivener’s errors) that are consistent with intent skepticism.  It therefore merits a 
close second look. 
I have previously asserted that this type of theory is impossible: that fidelity-
based reasons for error correction are inconsistent with intent-skepticism because 
fidelity-based reasons for overriding a clear text necessarily assume the existence 
of an intelligible notion of legislative intent lying behind the text.  Gold attempts to 
avoid this problem through the concept of constructive intent: a reasonable 
interpreter can construct an intent for a text that runs contrary to the literal import 
of the text, avoiding belief in any actual intent, and then remain faithful to this 
constructed, non-literal intent.  I will argue that Gold’s attempt ultimately fails.  
Despite his best efforts, he ends up violating the faithful agent theory.   
Take the Louisiana statute at issue in Scurto that allowed parties to impeach 
witness testimony “in any unlawful way.”132  Gold, I presume, would be willing to 
admit that the literal meaning of this text is that “parties can impeach witness 
testimony in any unlawful way.”  That is, this is the meaning expressed according 
to the relevant semantic and syntactic conventions; call it A. Yet Gold would 
instruct the judge to interpret the statute as expressing B: that “parties can impeach 
witness testimony in any lawful way.”  What reason does Gold have for asking 
judges to ascribe B, rather than A, to the text?   
Gold would argue that while the semantic and syntactic linguistic conventions 
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indicate that the statute is expressing A, there are higher-level linguistic 
conventions that compel us to read it as expressing B, not A.  For example, after 
recognizing the distinction, familiar to modern philosophy of language,133 between 
“speaker’s meaning” and “sentence meaning,”134 Gold discusses John Searle’s 
argument that “the notion of the literal meaning of a sentence only has application 
relative to a set of contextual or background assumptions,”135 and concludes that 
these types of “[p]resumptions about the use of language can include questions of 
gross injustice, at least at the margins.”136 
The contribution of context to an utterance’s meaning is the subject of the field 
of pragmatics, which leans heavily on the work of Grice, Searle, and John 
Austin.137  And the idea that a text’s meaning can only be understood in context is 
certainly uncontroversial among modern textualists.138  But it is also critical to the 
survival of textualism as an independent theory of statutory interpretation, I think, 
to follow Manning in differentiating between “semantic context” and “policy 
context.”139  The textualist can properly interpret a statutory text in light of 
contextual understandings of what is physically possible and how words are 
ordinarily used.  Textualists certainly would not want to say that the semantic 
conventions memorialized in dictionaries and the syntactic conventions found in 
Strunk and White exhaust the content of the linguistic conventions within a 
linguistic community.  Account must be taken of other conventions, such as the 
higher order conventions that govern phenomena like indirect speech acts140 and 
metaphor.141 
But textualists must take care to distinguish these types of contextual cues 
from the “policy context” of a statute.142  Including “questions of gross injustice” 
within the semantic context143 squints towards Hart and Sacks’s presumption that 
legislators are “reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.”144  
Declining to apply Puffendorf’s celebrated statute that penalized anyone who 
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“drew blood in the streets” to a surgeon attempting to save the life of someone 
fallen in the street145 because “one might expect the term ‘drew blood’ to describe a 
violent act”146 is a perfectly acceptable application of semantic context.  But 
refusing to apply the statute in this way because no one can reasonably be assumed 
to have made that value choice is to follow one’s own views about the good and the 
right instead of the policy views clearly expressed in the enacted text.  To import 
conventional policy considerations into the textualist enterprise of statutory 
interpretation is to undermine the very foundation of textualism: deference to the 
value choices of the legislature.  Gold’s theory, it turns out, is not fidelity-based 
after all; it contravenes the faithful agent theory in the same way that the more 
conventional underpinnings of the absurdity doctrine do and must be rejected for 
that reason. 
3.  Some Early Conclusions 
In this section, I have surveyed—and ultimately rejected—two textualist 
approaches to the problem of scrivener’s error.  While the section has done 
predominantly negative work, that work allows us to draw some positive 
conclusions, which it will be helpful to review before moving on.  I take the central 
conclusions of this section to be twofold: first, fidelity-based reasons for correcting 
scrivener’s errors are incompatible with intent-skeptical justifications for 
textualism, and second, non-fidelity-based reasons for correcting scrivener’s errors 
are either too weak to solve the problem or too strong to be counted as consistent 
with the faithful agent theory.  While not all non-fidelity-based reasons for error 
correction lead to a violation of the faithful agent theory, we can now conclude, 
after surveying both theories, that the non-fidelity based reasons that are 
compatible with the faithful agent theory, such as imposing minimum conditions of 
reasonableness on the legislature, are able to solve only a small subset of 
scrivener’s errors, leaving correction of some of the most egregious and obvious 
errors ungrounded.   Non-fidelity-based reasons for error correction that are robust 
enough to solve the entire set of errors end in asking judges to overrule the policy 
judgments of the legislative text in favor of their own views of the good and the 
right, and are for that reason inconsistent with the faithful agent theory, and hence 
with textualism. 
I conclude that an adequate textualist solution to the problem of scrivener’s 
error is incompatible with intent skepticism.  To the extent that a theory of statutory 
interpretation that fails to adequately address the problem of scrivener’s error is for 
that reason undesirable,147 it is incumbent on textualists to give non-intent-skeptical 
justifications for their textualist methodology and show how those justifications 
lead to an adequate solution to the scrivener’s error problem.  It is to this task that I 
now turn. 
                                                                                                     
 145. See United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 487 (1868). 
 146. Manning, supra note 10, at 2461. 
 147. See supra Part III.A. 
2011] TEXTUALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF SCRIVENER’S ERROR 143 
IV.  THE SCRIVENER’S ERROR DOCTRINE: A NEW CONCEPTUAL 
GROUNDING 
A.  Textualism 
The non-intent-skeptical justification for textualism that I find most 
compelling takes off from the important jurisprudential work of Joseph Raz, Andrei 
Marmor, and Jeremy Waldron.  According to Raz’s “Normal Justification Thesis”: 
The normal and primary way to establish that a person should be acknowledged to 
have authority over another person involves showing that the alleged subject is 
likely better to comply with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged 
authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as 
authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, than if he tries to follow the 
reasons which apply to him directly.148 
In turn, Marmor has noted:  
[T]his normal justification thesis is in fact compound, consisting of two distinct 
types of justification.  In some cases, compliance with the authority’s directives 
can only be justified on the basis of the assumption that the authority is likely to 
have better access to the right reasons bearing on the issue than its alleged 
subjects. . . .  At other occasions, it is enough to show that the authority is better 
situated than its alleged subjects to make the pertinent decision; that is, without 
thus being committed to the presumption that there are certain reasons for action, 
whose identification and ascertainment are more accessible to the persons in 
authority.149 
The first case Marmor calls the “expertise branch” of the normal justification 
thesis, while the latter category largely consists in the authority’s ability to solve 
collective action problems.  I will concentrate here on the first branch of the 
justification thesis, for three reasons.  First, I think it poses the harder case for 
textualists, and that the arguments presented below are applicable to the collective 
action branch in a fairly straightforward way.150  Second, I think much of the 
collective action branch can also be cast in terms of epistemic deference: that is, the 
subject defers to the value choices151 made by the authority because the authority 
has better access to information of a certain kind than does the subject.152  Finally, I 
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think that the expertise branch generally plays a larger role in justifying 
legislation.153  For these reasons, I will describe obedience to authority in terms of 
epistemic deference to authoritatively enacted value choices. 
Jeremy Waldron has offered a justification of textualism based on the 
argument that any reason we have for considering a statute adopted by a multi-
member lawmaking body as worthy of epistemic deference “is also a reason for 
discounting the authority of the views or intentions of particular legislators 
considered on their own.”154  Waldron considers three arguments for deferring to 
such bodies.  First, “The Utilitarian Argument”: from the utilitarian point of view, 
if each legislator votes the interests of her constituents and the constituents are 
proportionally represented in the legislature, then the resulting legislation will tend 
to reflect the optimal satisfaction of individual interests.155  Second, “Condorcet’s 
Jury Theorem”: according to this theorem, multi-member decision-making bodies 
have a lower probability of error than an individual decider.156  Finally, 
“Aristotelian Synthesis”: multi-member bodies have higher epistemic capabilities 
than individuals because “a number of individuals may bring a diversity of 
perspectives to bear on the complex issues under consideration, and . . . they are 
capable of pooling these perspectives to come up with better decisions than any one 
of them could make on his own.”157  But each of these justifications of group 
authority also demonstrates that the capabilities of each member of the group are 
significantly lower than the capabilities of the group as a whole.158 
This alone is not enough to get us to textualism: the three arguments justify 
according authority to whatever decisions are made by the group, and these 
decisions, so far as we’ve gone, might just as well be expressed in an amorphous 
intent as a canonical text.  The crucial step in the argument is to insist that “[t]here 
simply is no fact of the matter concerning a legislature’s intention apart from the 
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  Do X Do Y 
A Do X 1, 1 2, 2 
 Do Y 2, 2 1, 1 
Here, clearly, the problem for A is simply that she doesn’t know which one B is going to pick, and the 
same for B, mutatis mutandis.  If an authority exists who A has reason to believe does know which B 
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the authority has made the choice of X salient through a system of sanctions doesn’t obscure the fact 
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B) to defer to the authority.  A similar interpretation might be possible for partially-competitive games 
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formal specification of the act it has performed.”159  This act “is the text of the 
statute as determined by the institution’s procedures.  Those procedures make [the 
legislators] one in action, and their identification of something as the text of a 
statute makes [the legislators] one as the authors of a deed.  Before that, however, 
and beyond that, [the legislators] are many, and no further status as part of the 
unum can be attributed to anything else that any of [them] says or thinks.”160 
Despite the different flavor from the intent-skeptical arguments considered 
earlier,161 then, Waldron’s textualism is intent-skeptical as well.  Moreover, what 
makes it skeptical is precisely what makes it textualist.  In the remainder of this 
section, I hope to sketch an argument for confining the interpretation of statutes to 
their text that is similar to Waldron’s but that leaves room for a conception of 
legislative intent that, although thin, is robust enough to support a fidelity-based 
argument for correction of scrivener’s error. 
The first step in my argument is also Waldron’s first step: showing that the 
reasons we have for epistemically deferring to the legislature’s value choices only 
apply to those choices that have survived appropriate procedural hurdles.162  I take 
it that for reasons very much like the ones Waldron offers there are sound reasons 
for epistemically deferring to the legislature; I will not repeat or expand on those 
reasons here.  But there are a number of procedural constraints that we impose on 
legislators before we take their value choices as worthy of epistemic deference.  
First, as Waldron emphasizes, we require them to act as a legislature, that is, 
collectively and orderly.  The only way for a body made up of diverse members 
with diverse points of view to act as one in an orderly fashion is for them to adopt 
certain procedures such as quorum requirements, rules of order and debate, and 
voting rules.163  Relatedly, legislative choices are worthy of deference on epistemic 
grounds only if the legislators had the opportunity to know what it was that they 
were debating and voting on—if we defer to legislative value choices, it must be 
because the legislators intended to choose them, and for them to have intended to 
choose them, they must have been aware of what their choices were.164 
This last, I think, is close to what Raz is getting at in his noted suggestion that 
intentions must be relevant to statutory interpretation in at least a minimal way.165  
“[T]o assume that the law made by legislation is not the one intended by the 
legislator,” Raz writes, “we must assume that he cannot predict what law he is 
making when the legislature passes any piece of legislation.”166  But if that is so, it 
is hard to see why we care about who we elect as legislators, why we seek to make 
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them accountable to the electorate, or why we impose procedural requirements on 
their legislative choices.  So legislators, it seems, must have some minimum 
amount of control over the content of the enacted law.  However, this minimum 
control is satisfied, Raz goes on to suggest, so long as legislators “know that they 
are, if they carry the majority, making law, and they know how to find out what 
law they are making” by establishing “the meaning of the text in front of them, 
when understood as it will be according to their legal culture.”167 
Second, we generally expect that if a legislature presents a value choice as 
authoritative, more members supported the choice than opposed it: otherwise we 
would have a reason to reject the value choice.  But as Manning has emphasized, 
we also want minorities to have their say; we want the legislature to adopt 
procedures that will subject its proposed measures to fair and open debate and 
disagreement, rather than procedures that allow the majority to ride roughshod over 
the minority.168  Depending on our view of the role of government, we may even 
want to require supermajorities at certain points in the process so as to slow the 
pace of legislation.169  But whether or not we are able to agree on the desirability of 
less legislation,170 we should be able to agree that we want to design procedures 
that promote robust deliberation within the legislature.  If we are epistemically 
deferring to the legislature because it is a multi-member body, presumably one of 
the advantages we hope to gain from such a body is the full airing-out of different 
points of view.  But, this is only possible if the legislature follows orderly 
procedures designed to ensure open debate.171 
Finally, and relatedly, if we want minorities to have a say and choices to be 
subject to full and fair debate, we presumably want to allow compromise between 
parties within the legislature who cannot come to a consensus.  That is, we want to 
allow legislators an option other than “vote for X” or “vote against X,” such as 
“vote for X in return for Y,” or “vote for only 60% of X.”  For this to be possible, 
the legislature must follow procedures that allow amendments and allow the 
legislature to choose between rules or standards172 and between different levels of 
generality.173 
All of these process considerations provide us with reasons to epistemically 
defer to value choices that have emerged from legislatures of a particular kind, that 
have adopted those choices after following particular processes.  If a legislative 
body fails to follow the right processes in enacting a given value choice, that choice 
might be entirely unworthy of our epistemic deference, since it lacks the procedural 
credentials that form the basis for this deference in the first place.  For example, if 
we learned that a statute was enacted by a group of legislators that constituted less 
than the minimum quorum for business, or if we discovered that legislators were 
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not allowed to know anything more than the title of the act when they voted for it, 
we would presumably have very little reason to defer to that statute. 
The second step in the argument is to note that we care about the prescriptive 
content—that is, the discrete set of value choices—expressed by the laws that are 
being imposed on us, not the form of words that is used.  For example, if the 
legislature passes a law that says “no vehicles in the park” and “vehicles” is 
interpreted, based on legislative history, to include bicycles, the same prescriptive 
content has been enforced as if the legislature had passed a law saying “no vehicles 
in the park, and vehicles shall include bicycles for the purposes of this statute.”174  
And since we care about the value choices that are enforced, it is those choices that 
we want to pass through the procedural hurdles that constrain legislation.  So if the 
only dispositive reason to include bicycles as “vehicles” is a piece of legislative 
history that expresses the opinion of only a minority of legislators, then the choice 
to include bicycles as “vehicles” is not worthy of deference, since we have no 
reason to believe that this choice actually survived the procedural hurdles. 
The final step in the argument emphasizes that to reap the epistemic benefits of 
the process considerations discussed above, at least two conditions must be met.  
First, for a legislature’s set of value choices to be of any epistemic value, the set 
must be consistent: it cannot command both P and ~P.175  This means the product 
of the legislature’s deliberation must be unified, in a way.176  One way the 
legislature might speak with one voice is by appointing a single member from its 
body to speak for it, either as to all issues or as to a specific area of law.  But by 
delegating all legislative authority to one legislator, the legislature would 
undermine the distinctive benefits of group lawmaking—we could achieve the 
same result simply by electing a dictator outright and cutting out the middlemen.  
The value choices of an elective dictator might be worthy of epistemic deference 
under plausible conditions (Hobbes, at least, seems to have thought so177), but one 
of our working premises has been that group deliberation and decision is 
epistemically superior to a single individual’s deliberation and decision.  
Delegating all decision making authority to a single member of the group loses 
much of this superiority.   
So the second requirement is that each individual legislature must be given the 
opportunity to help define the contours of each value choice.  Otherwise the unique 
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epistemic benefits of group deliberation and lawmaking are squandered.  Focusing 
legislative debate on the content of a text satisfies these twin conditions.  Indeed, 
it’s hard to see how else it would be possible for multiple legislators to agree 
together on a specific set of value choices while preserving every individual 
legislator’s ability to contribute to the shape and scope of each value choice.  One 
might say that the existence of a shared text enables a collective legislative intent to 
form. 
Now for a legislature to impose value choices on its citizens it must 
communicate those choices to its citizens.  That is, laws cannot constitute reasons 
for action—citizens cannot epistemically defer to the value choices expressed by 
those laws—unless there is a way for the citizens to ascertain the prescriptive 
content expressed by those laws.178  And for reasons having to do with the special 
properties of the written word,179 the textual medium is aptly suited to the task of 
communicating the legislature’s value choices to the citizenry.  The text performs 
two critical roles in the creation and implementation of statutes, then: it makes it 
possible for a multi-member legislature to bring their minds together and create a 
unified intent, and it allows the legislature to communicate that intent to 
subordinates, for implementation. 
But this text must be interpreted, must be understood, in the normal way unless 
there is a special reason to understand it in a different way.  And the normal way of 
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understanding a text can only be the way that an average reader, familiar with the 
relevant conventions current in the relevant linguistic community, would 
understand it.  And a special reason for understanding the text in any way other 
than the normal way must be a reason that has the same procedural bona fides as 
the text itself, if it is to be worthy of deference.  Understood in this way, textualism 
is not a limitation on the ways in which Congress can use its words.  Like Humpty 
Dumpty, Congress can use its words to mean whatever it wants them to mean;180 
textualists insist only that Congress go through the ordinary bundle of procedural 
hurdles before it uses its words in ways that differ from their standard, conventional 
meaning.181  
B.  Scrivener’s Error—Theory 
In the last section I offered a normative justification for textualism.  The 
justification did not insist that a particular type of interpretive methodology is 
conceptually necessary, or that it is, as a descriptive matter, the only type of 
interpretation that is possible.  Rather, the justification asserts that statutory 
interpretation is a tool that is designed to play a particular role in the social 
enterprise of law and authority, that this social enterprise fulfills certain ends or 
purposes, such as the allocation of epistemic deference to those we deem to be in 
the best position to make certain value choices, and that textualism is a desirable 
account of statutory interpretation because it best allows the social practice of law 
to fulfill these purposes. 
But having just laid out the case against intentionalist interpretation, it may 
seem hard to make out the textualist case for correcting scrivener’s errors.  After 
all, evidence that a particular statutory provision should read “lawful” instead of 
“unlawful”182 is certainly a reason against the standard, conventional reading of the 
text, and it is a reason that doesn’t seem to have passed through the ordinary bundle 
of procedural constraints.  Isn’t such a reading barred by the case I just finished 
making?  Indeed, isn’t the theory of textualism just offered thoroughly intent-
skeptical? 
Before suggesting an answer to these questions it might be worthwhile to 
pause and reflect on the conditions we should expect the answer to satisfy—the 
criteria of adequacy of any textualist solution to the problem of scrivener’s error, if 
you will.  These conditions can usefully be placed into two broad categories: 
conditions the theory must meet if it is to be “textualist,” and conditions it must 
meet if it is to adequately solve the problem of scrivener’s error.  We should 
already have a fairly clear idea of what the conditions in the first category look like.  
Our earlier discussion of textualism has revealed that for the proposed theory to be 
textualist, it must be consistent with the faithful agent theory.183  Further, the theory 
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should be consistent with the rejection of the ordinary use of legislative history.184  
As to the second category, for a proposed solution to adequately solve the problem 
of scrivener’s error it must do two things.  First, it must explain why a textual 
segment that is the result of a scrivener’s error should not be followed.  Second, the 
argument must show why the error should not only be ignored but should be 
corrected: why the courts should enforce as part of the statute a command that is 
not, strictly speaking, contained in its text. 
The sense in which the justification for textualism just sketched is not intent-
skeptical—and the key to an adequate textualist solution to the problem of 
scrivener’s error—can be seen, I want to suggest, in the familiar distinction 
between the legislature’s intent to enact certain words and its intent that those 
words be interpreted in a certain way.185  Any theory of statutory interpretation 
applies to only a tiny subset of existing texts.  In the case of the theory outlined 
above, there is no reason to epistemically defer to the value choices expressed by 
the conventional meaning of the texts found in the Harvard Law Review, or the 
New York Times, or the Complete Tales and Poems of Edgar Allan Poe.  A theory 
of statutory interpretation relies, that is, on a set of criteria that identifies certain 
textual segments to which it applies.  Using the criteria to pick out these textual 
segments is a prior step to applying the theory’s interpretive methodology.  
According to the textualist theory advocated here, legislative intent, while properly 
ignored at the stage of interpreting statutes for the reasons discussed in the previous 
section, is crucial to identifying which texts should count as statutes in the first 
place. 
Before we can even identify a text as a statute, we have to identify a set of 
markings as a text.  That is, before we can apply our criteria of statutory identity, 
we need to apply criteria of textual identity.  Steven Knapp and Walter Benn 
Michaels famously argued, in a series of articles, that authorial intent must form a 
part of this set of criteria for determining textual identity.186  Briefly examining 
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their argument will help to illustrate the distinction between the intention to utter a 
text and the intention to mean something by that utterance.   
The central thrust of Knapp and Michaels’ argument is centered around the 
following example: imagine that you come across the first stanza to Wordsworth’s 
poem A Slumber Did my Spirit Seal carved out in the sand, along the beach.  As 
you gaze at the marks in the sand, a wave washes over the words, and as it recedes, 
you are amazed to see that the second stanza of the poem is now etched in the 
sand.187  According to Knapp and Michaels, unless you posit some unconventional 
author—such as the ghost of Wordsworth, or a team of scientists, perhaps testing 
some water-activated chemical—you must recognize at this point that the marks in 
the sand are not words but “merely seem to resemble words.”188  “As long as you 
thought the marks were poetry, you were assuming their intentional character. . . .  
But to deprive them of an author is to convert them into accidental likenesses of 
language.  They are not, after all, an example of intentionless meaning; as soon as 
they become intentionless they become meaningless as well.”189 
Now, as David Couzens Hoy points out, assigning meaning to marks we know 
were produced unintentionally doesn’t seem to be strictly impossible,190 but it does 
seem to be very far from what we mean by the concept of interpretation.  Knapp 
and Michaels, in a later article, point to the difference between interpreting a text 
and writing a new one: to claim that she is producing an interpretation of a text 
rather than a different text, an interpreter needs “a criterion of textual identity that 
will allow the text to remain the same while its meaning changes.”191  In yet 
another article, they produce a reductio ad absurdum to show that author’s 
intention is the only possible such criterion:  
[I]f we agree that some marks produced by chance are meaningful, do we want to 
claim that all marks produced by chance are meaningful? Presumably not.  
Presumably the only marks that have meaning are the ones that look like the marks 
humans make when they are using marks to mean something. . . .  But what about 
marks that don’t look like words in any known language, but that will look like 
words in some language when that language (say, five hundred years from now) 
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has evolved? . . .  To think that some marks produced by chance are texts is thus 
apparently to commit oneself to the view that all marks produced by chance, 
whether they were texts once or are texts now, will eventually be texts, and will be 
texts in an infinite number of languages.192 
I think this argument is fairly strong, but from here Knapp and Michaels make an 
important but, I think, unwarranted leap.  While their argument may show that 
intention forms a necessary part of any criteria-set of textual identity, this tells us 
nothing about the possible criteria of textual meaning.193  Knapp and Michaels 
generally confuse these two throughout their discussion in these later articles, but, 
as I have argued above, they seem entirely separable.  It may be true that we can 
only consider a text to be a text if it was intended as such by someone, but it takes 
an additional argument to show that in interpreting the meaning of that text we 
must confine ourselves to the meaning that the author intended it to have.   
Above, I have argued that intention simply doesn’t have this kind of relevance 
to the question of meaning, at least in the case of statutory interpretation.  But 
before one can apply this argument, one additional step is needed: we not only need 
to identify a series of marks as a text, but we need to identify a text as a statute, 
valid in our jurisdiction; and for this second step, intention also turns out to be 
highly relevant.  From the perspective of the justification for textualism offered 
above, it shouldn’t be hard to see why: the ordinary reasons for epistemically 
deferring to the legislature’s textually embedded value choices simply don’t apply 
to textual segments that the legislature never intended to enact.   
The solution I have been sketching satisfies, then, the first condition that a 
proposed theory must meet if it is to adequately solve the scrivener’s-error 
problem:  it justifies disregarding a duly-passed textual segment that is the result of 
a scrivener’s error, despite textualism’s standard interpretive methodology. My 
claim has been that the criteria of textual and statutory identity that underlie 
textualism demand that unintended textual segments deserve no epistemic 
deference and hence do not even count as part of the statutory cannon, the object to 
which textualism’s standard methodology is applied.  To see the case for correcting 
errors—the second condition—we need to recall that the text performs two critical 
roles in the process of making legislation.  First, it makes it possible for a body of 
legislators, each with his or her own values, commitments, and projects, to come 
together as one and agree on a unified set of value choices.  Voting serially to 
embed certain discrete choices in a text allows consensus to form around 
undisputed points and enables negotiations, compromises, and trade-offs in areas of 
disagreement.  Second, once the text has enabled a single harmony to emerge from 
the cacophony, it is ordinarily the exclusive means of communicating this resultant, 
harmonious set of choices to others. 
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Even statutory texts that contain scrivener’s errors have successfully 
performed the first function.  A statute that includes a clause permitting the 
“unlawful” impeachment of witnesses, where there is conclusive evidence that a 
passing majority of legislators intended the clause to read “lawful” rather than 
“unlawful,” has successfully allowed the legislature to unite around a course of 
action that contains the permission of lawful witness impeachment.  This value 
choice is worthy of our deference, on the theory of authority sketched earlier, since 
it surmounted all of the procedural hurdles that we required.  Even erroneous 
textual segments succeed in performing the first function of statutory texts, then, 
but they are less than fully successful in performing the second function.  Because 
the wording is erroneous, they communicate the wrong value choices to 
government officials further along in the chain of authorities who carry out the law.  
However, the error in wording need not be a complete bar to communication—and 
therefore implementation—of the law.  Where the choice the legislature took itself 
to be making and passing along is obvious, a mere mistake in wording should not 
prevent other officials and citizens from following the value choices that emerged 
from the proper process and can be understood, despite the mistake. 
The case for textualism, I have argued, is bottomed on a conception of 
authority that counsels epistemic deference to the value choices embedded in a 
legislatively enacted text.  From this, we can meet the two conditions that any 
approach to scrivener’s error must meet in order to justify the correction of such 
errors.  First, if we have near-conclusive evidence that an otherwise valid statute 
contains a scrivener’s error and for that reason contains a textual segment that the 
legislature in fact did not intend to enact, there is no reason for us to defer to the 
value choices embedded in that piece of unintentional legislation.194  Put 
differently, intention forms a necessary part of the criteria used to identify valid 
statutes, just like the criteria used to identify texts.  Believing that a text has been 
intentionally passed by the legislature is a precondition to treating it as a valid 
statute in the first place, on the theory of authority we have been assuming.195 
                                                                                                     
 194. See  Recent Case, supra note 18, at 2120 (“When the actual words of a statute conflict with the 
joint legislative and executive understanding of its meaning, enforcing the literal words frustrates the 
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 195. This accords with Raz’s conclusion that “the interpretation of statutes, etc., in accord with 
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that the phenomenon is not as rare as Raz might think.  Moreover, it is hard to see how Raz’s argument 
that legislators must have some minimal intentional control over the content of law in order to satisfy 
any realistic theory of authority can be squared with treating known scrivener’s errors as binding.  No 
legislator chooses to make a mistake, and no legislature can choose not to, or choose what the content of 
that mistake will be.  See Recent Case, supra note 18, at 2120 (“Scriveners’ errors occur frequently and 
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Second, if there is near-conclusive evidence that a particular, concrete value 
choice did in fact survive the procedural hurdles and that the legislative majority 
that passed the statute did in fact take itself to be embedding that choice in the text 
it enacted, the reasons that generally counsel deference to the outcomes of the 
legislative process also counsel deference to these value choices, despite the fact 
that they were not communicated in the ordinarily exclusive way, through the 
conventional meaning of the enacted text.  Despite the error, the text has enabled a 
unified intent to emerge from the legislature and has succeeded in enabling later 
legal actors to divine this intent. 
An example may help to make these rather abstract considerations more 
concrete and easier to grasp.  Take the clerical error in 28 U.S.C. § 1453, which 
caused some headaches in the circuit courts, until Congress corrected the error in 
2009.  Section 1453 deals with the removal to federal court of class action lawsuits; 
(c)(1) provided that “a court of appeals may accept an appeal from an order of a 
district court granting or denying a motion to remand a class action to the State 
court from which it was removed if application is made to the court of appeals not 
less than 7 days after entry of the order.”196  Read literally, the provision allowed 
parties to appeal an order disposing of a motion to remand only if they applied for 
the appeal after seven days had passed since the order was entered, a fairly absurd 
requirement.  Beginning in 2005, a series of circuit courts confronted the peculiar 
text, with each court holding that the error ought to be corrected to read “not more 
than 7 days,” since “no logical purpose [is] attained by requiring a party to wait 
seven days before seeking to appeal an order granting or denying a motion to 
remand, and then allowing that party to seek appellate review at any time in the 
future after the period has passed.”197  Moreover, “the uncontested legislative intent 
behind § 1453(c) was to impose a seven-day deadline for appeals.”198  In 2009, 
Congress corrected the error and simultaneously expanded the window for 
application for review to 10 days.199 
According to the theory I am defending, the courts properly corrected the 
error.  Assuming that that the evidence of error was as conclusive as the courts 
thought, no real choice to enact a text requiring a waiting period of seven days ever 
cleared the hurdles of the lawmaking process, so such a choice deserved no more 
                                                                                                     
are the unintentional mistakes of the Congress’s clerical staff—no degree of legislative responsibility 
can either anticipate or eradicate them.”).  So long as mistakes happen and can be identified as such, 
interpreting them as valid enactments would seem to deprive the legislature of the minimum necessary 
control over the content of these provisions of the law.  Raz’s emphasis on “clarity in demarcating what 
counts as an exercise of authority and what does not” is well taken, however; throughout this discussion, 
I have been assuming that scrivener’s errors can be clearly identified.  I discuss some of the practical 
implications of the importance of clarity below, see infra notes 247–255 and accompanying text.  The 
point is highly relevant for the development of practical scrivener’s error doctrine, but given that at least 
some scrivener’s errors do exist and can be clearly identified, I am not sure how relevant the question of 
clarity is to the conceptual questions underlying that doctrine, discussed in this section. 
 196. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 197. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 435 F.3d 1140, 1146 
(9th Cir. 2006). 
 198. Morgan v. Gay, 466 F.3d 276, 277 (3d Cir. 2006).  Accord Estate of Pew v. Cardarelli, 527 F.3d 
25, 27–28 (2d Cir. 2008); Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 2006); Pritchett v. 
Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1093 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 199. Act of May 7, 2009 U.S.C.A.N. (123 Stat.) 1607, 1608 (2009). 
2011] TEXTUALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF SCRIVENER’S ERROR 155 
deference than if the clerk taking the freshly-passed text to be published had been 
waylaid by lobbyists opposed to the bill who had surreptitiously substituted the 
word “less” for “more.”  On the other hand, the choice to enact a text embedding a 
7 day limitation period was supported by a legislative majority that had survived 
the requisite procedural constraints: this choice was the very choice that the 
legislature had taken itself to be enacting, according to the conclusive (we’re 
assuming) evidence.  An obvious error in communicating this choice should not be 
taken as affecting the deference-worthiness of the choice itself. 
The proposed solution thus justifies both disregarding a statutory provision 
that was unintentionally enacted and enforcing as part of the statute the provision 
that the legislature intended to enact.  It is therefore an adequate solution to the 
problem of scrivener’s error.  I submit that this approach to scrivener’s error also 
meets the two conditions that any such theory must meet in order to be textualist: it 
justifies correction of scrivener’s errors while adhering to the faithful agent theory 
and remaining consistent with a principled rejection of both the ordinary use of 
legislative history and purposivism.  It plainly falls within the confines of the 
faithful agent theory, since the reasons for error correction are fidelity-based.  The 
value choices of Congress, the theory holds, deserve the epistemic deference of its 
faithful agents in the judiciary, and those agents ought to prescind from their own 
all-things-considered judgments as to the wisdom, desirability, or goodness of 
those choices, even when it is hard to see what values are furthered by application 
of a seemingly over or under-inclusive rule.  The theory only demands that to be 
deference-worthy, these choices need to be embedded in a text that Congress took 
itself to be enacting into law.  The justification offered by the theory for correcting 
scrivener’s errors, then, is strictly fidelity-based, and therefore falls within the 
faithful agent theory, where textualism has long found its home. 
The theory also rejects the ordinary use of legislative history, although not on 
intent-skeptical grounds, since it relies on a non-intent-skeptical justification for 
textualism itself.  Judges ought to decline to give potentially dispositive weight to 
materials such as sponsor’s statements and committee reports because those 
materials have not survived the crucible of procedural constraints through which 
we demand any legislative value choice to pass before according it epistemic 
deference.  Those value choices that do clear these procedural hurdles, moreover, 
can ordinarily only be communicated through the enacted text.  Judges ought to 
ignore the choices expressed by the conventional meaning of the purported 
legislative text only in the very rare case where there is near-conclusive evidence 
that the text itself does not meet, in certain respects, the fundamental criteria we 
must use in identifying some texts as valid statutes in the first place—criteria that 
include the requirement that the text be intentionally passed.200 
Finally, this approach to scrivener’s error is equipped to deal with errors that 
do not result in a deviant text, as well as those that do, as the above discussion of 
                                                                                                     
 200. Since it adheres to the faithful agent theory and is consistent with the rejection of the ordinary 
use of legislative history, the theory is also consistent with Manning’s reasons for rejecting the absurdity 
doctrine.  Although I have not emphasized the distinction between textualism and purposivism in this 
article, the proposed theory is also consistent with the rejection of purposivism, since it requires an 
interpreter to respect the legislature’s choice to express its value choices at a certain level of generality.  
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.  
156 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1 
28 U.S.C. § 1453 demonstrates.  It is for that reason more desirable, ceteris 
paribus, than the theories we examined in Part III, none of which was capable of 
justifying the correction of the entire class of scrivener’s errors. 
C.  Scrivener’s Error—Practice 
Up to now, I have been tacitly assuming away an issue that, we can now see, is 
tremendously important: I have assumed that the evidence for believing there is an 
error in the text is “near-conclusive.”  But I have said little or nothing about what 
kind of evidence, or how much of it, judges ought to demand before finding a text 
to contain a scrivener’s error.  We can see at once that how we answer these 
questions determines to a great degree the usefulness and desirability of the theory.  
If the evidentiary requirements of the theory are quite low and condone the 
correction of alleged errors whenever an argument for correction passes the laugh 
test, the suggested approach to scrivener’s error would be fidelity-based in name 
only, surreptitiously undermining the epistemic justification of textualism.   
On the other hand, if the evidentiary requirements were quite strict, allowing 
correction of only the most obvious and egregious errors, the theory would be 
undesirable for the very reasons we rejected the existing approaches to scrivener’s 
error: it would fail to justify correction of the entire class of errors in fact, if not in 
theory.  In this final section I address these evidentiary concerns, describing the 
types of evidence I would admit and the level of evidence I would require and 
articulating the ways in which the proposed theory would differ in practice from 
the approach to scrivener’s error that is current among textualist judges. 
The errors that most easily satisfy any plausible evidentiary requirement are 
those that result in deviant texts.  If the provision at hand is missing a verb, like 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F) & (G), discussed earlier,201 there is no question that there 
has been a “drafting snafu.”202  Or, to take a fresh example, a 1909 Nevada law 
regulated the primary system for state elections.203  In 1911, the Nevada legislature 
amended Section 2 of the act but left out a crucial comma: § 2, as amended, 
provided, inter alia, that “[t]his act shall not apply to special elections to fill 
vacancies to the nomination of party candidates for presidential electors, nor to the 
nomination of officers of the incorporated cities, whose charters or ordinances now 
or may hereafter provide a system of nominating candidates for such offices, nor to 
the nomination of officers for reclamation and irrigation districts.”204   
As the Nevada Supreme Court noted, the final version of the bill was 
apparently missing a comma after “vacancies.”205  To exempt both “special 
elections to fill vacancies” and “the nomination of presidential electors” from the 
scope of the law makes at least linguistic sense, but the court was at a loss to divine 
what “a special election to fill vacancies to the nominations” could conceivably 
be.206  In the case of deviant texts like this one, no evidence of scrivener’s error is 
                                                                                                     
 201. Supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. 
 202. United States v. Banda-Zamora, 178 F.3d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 1999) 
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 205. State ex rel. Allen v. Brodigan, 125 P. 699, 700–02 (Nev. 1912). 
 206. Id. at 701. 
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needed beyond the face of the text itself; it takes no argument to show that 
“colorless green ideas” cannot “sleep furiously,”207 that a meaningless statutory 
provision cannot conceivably “reflect[] a deliberate legislative compromise.”208 
The evidentiary question is much more difficult for most non-deviant errors.  
A first question, which we’ve skirted several times but have not yet directly 
addressed, is whether the textualist can properly consider legislative history in 
determining whether or not she is faced with an error.    Because legislative history 
is so closely associated with the intentionalist style of interpretation that textualists 
take as their target,209 and because the abuses of legislative history have been so 
notorious,210 textualists are justifiably suspicious of any and all uses of legislative 
history.211  But I want to suggest that occasionally legislative history can properly 
be used to support a claim of scrivener’s error. 
Recall from above212 that 49 U.S.C. § 14704 addressed two types of violations 
by interstate carriers: actions that violated certain regulations, in subsection (a), and 
certain illegal overcharges, in subsection (b).213  Section 14705, in turn, created 
limitation periods, with (b) limiting administrative complaints regarding general 
overcharges to 3 years,214 and (c) providing a two-year limitation for complaints 
“under section 14704(b).”215  But the reference to § 14704(b) was odd, since that 
subsection also dealt with overcharges, albeit a limited class of them, while actions 
under § 14704(a)(2) went unaddressed by the limitations section of the statute.  We 
discovered above that the legislative history of the provision provided a very 
plausible explanation for this peculiarity: in the original language of both the House 
and Senate bills, (a)(2) had been numbered (b)(2) and accordingly would have been 
subject to § 14705(c).216  One of a series of last minute amendments had changed 
the numbering of this provision in the version that ended up being adopted by the 
conference committee, and then by both houses, even though “in the Conference 
Report Congress specifically stated that it intended to preserve the relevant statute 
of limitations, which was two years under the former Interstate Commerce Act.”217  
Moreover, “Congress specifically stated that it intended to make the limitations 
period uniform for all types of carriers,” and the “statute of limitations for the 
parallel provisions governing rail and pipeline carriers is two years.”218  Here, the 
legislative history provides a crucial evidential link on the way to discovering error: 
standing alone, the fact that the statute leaves the (a)(2) claims to be governed by 
the default four-year statute of limitations is odd, but hardly so absurd that it could 
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not have been intended.  But the drafting history of the provision suggests that this 
result was, in fact not intended and thus provides us with near-conclusive proof that 
the reference to (b) is a scrivener’s error. 
Importantly, the drafting history in this case has two features that justify our 
reliance.  First, the evidence goes to show that the text that was ultimately passed 
was not the text the legislature took itself to be passing.  But for the last minute 
renumbering, (a)(2) would have been numbered as (b)(2)—the textual content the 
legislature plausibly thought it was passing.  This relates to the distinction between 
intended wording and intended meaning discussed earlier: any evidence that 
legislators thought § 14705 should be interpreted to cover § 14704(a)(2) would, on 
its own, be evidence of intentions that had not passed the bundle of procedural 
hurdles we require choices to clear before they become law.  Interpreting based on 
this evidence would be barred by the process-based argument for textualism.  But 
the evidence here goes to show something more fundamental: that the textual 
reference to 14704(b) was unintended, and as such, does not pass the criteria of 
identity we use to identify certain texts as valid statutes in the first place. 
Second, most of the legislative history here is of a kind that is relatively free 
from manipulation.  Textualists have developed a sensitivity to the risk that 
legislative history is disingenuous.219  With sponsor’s statements and committee 
reports, it is all too easy for individual legislators to insert whatever they want into 
the legislative record in the hopes of influencing interpreters further down the 
pipe—indeed, it is fear of this kind of behavior that underlies much of the 
textualist’s insistence that any reason for a non-conventional interpretation must 
itself have cleared all of the relevant procedural hurdles.  Knowledge by legislators 
that judges are willing to consult legislative history, even if just to find scrivener’s 
errors, might produce strategic behavior on their part: legislators might seek a way 
to plant the legislative record with false suggestion that a scrivener’s error has 
occurred. 220   
To the extent that consulting legislative history—even for these limited 
purposes—creates these risks, textualists are right to be suspicious.  But most of the 
legislative history in this case consists of the history of the bill’s organization and 
the various structural incarnations it went through as it made its way to becoming 
law.  Even where the argument from legislative history relies on committee reports 
or statements by individual legislators, it does so only to provide additional 
evidence for an inference that is drawn from the structural history of the bill.  
Legislative history of this kind—evidence of the prior organization and numbering 
of provisions—is uniquely, even if not completely, resistant to manipulation and, 
when backed up by evidence drawn from less reliable sources, can form the basis 
of a powerful inference that an error in draftsmanship has occurred.221   
So legislative history may occasionally provide very persuasive evidence that 
there has been a drafting error.  Another source courts often look to in determining 
whether there has been an error is the absurdity of the literal reading of the statute.  
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This too can be an important source of probative evidence that a statutory text 
contains a clerical error.  Consider the Kentucky statute at issue in Bird v. Board of 
Commissioners.222  There, the Kentucky legislature had imposed a tax for the 
construction of turnpikes, “provided that the width of the macadam223 shall not be 
less than eight inches nor more than fifteen inches.”224  So the tax could only be 
used to finance roads that were less than fifteen inches wide!  Here, the absurdity of 
the statute as written is almost dictated by the laws of physics: unless the legislature 
is to be understood as financing turnpikes for toy cars, the wording must be 
erroneous.  Indeed, the evidence of error here is nearly as strong as in the case of 
the deviant texts discussed above. 
Harder cases arise when the error results in texts that strike us as clearly 
erroneous because of our policy intuitions, rather than because of the necessary 
nature of things like turnpikes and automobiles.  Recall the statute in Scurto v. 
LeBlanc, which we’ve trotted out so many times, that allowed impeachment of 
testimony “in any unlawful way.”225  Here, the intuition seems so strong that the 
Louisiana legislature just couldn’t have intended to allow “unlawful” impeachment 
that no additional evidence seems necessary to conclude that we must be faced with 
a drafting error.  Indeed, it’s hard to know what it could even mean to lawfully 
provide for the unlawful impeachment of testimony: isn’t the statute self-
defeating?226   
Contrast Scurto with the famous case of United States v. Locke.227  There, the 
Court dealt with the annual filing requirements of the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976.  That act requires the owners of certain classes of 
mining claims to file certain documents each year “prior to December 31.”228  One 
would have expected the statute to require filing of the documents “on or before 
December 31.”  The statute as worded creates the odd result that someone who files 
on the last day of the year has filed too late and is in violation of the Act.  The 
appellees in Locke, who were in exactly this position, argued that the statutory 
language was a scrivener’s error; that Congress had meant to set the deadline at the 
end of the year, rather than one day before. 
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, rejected the appellees’ argument, on 
the grounds that “[t]o attempt to decide whether some date other than the one set 
out in the statute is the date actually ‘intended’ by Congress is to set sail on an 
aimless journey, for the purpose of a filing deadline would be just as well served by 
nearly any date a court might choose as by the date Congress has in fact set out in 
the statute.”229  But of course this argument is a bit disingenuous: a deadline of on 
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or before December 31 is hardly an “arbitrary one.”  December 31 is the end of the 
calendar year and hence a natural point at which to set a deadline.  Indeed, as 
Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, “no one has suggested any rational basis 
for omitting just one day from the period in which an annual filing may be made,” 
and setting the deadline at this point in fact feels a little like “a trap for the 
unwary.”230 
Marshall’s argument that “the United States Code is sprinkled with provisions 
that require action ‘prior to’ some date, including at least 14 provisions that 
contemplate action ‘prior to December 31,’”231 fares better, I think.  Stevens 
attempts to parry the thrust by showing that “[e]leven of the provisions refer to a 
one-time specific date” and that “each of the specific dates mentioned in the 11 
provisions is long past; thus, contrary to the Court’s premise, this decision would 
have no effect on them because they require no future action.”232  But this response 
cuts little ice against Marshall’s basic point that the deadline of one day before the 
end of the year is not unique to this statute, which significantly dampens the 
plausibility that it was an isolated scrivener’s error.  If the formulation has been 
used 14 different times, it seems far more likely that it is intentional and reflects 
some hidden goal or compromise.  Without more evidence of error, the deadline is 
odd, I think, but the implausibility that it reflects some hidden legislative goal does 
not rise to the level needed to correct it as a scrivener’s error.  Providing for 
unlawful impeachment of testimony is so absurd, as a policy matter, as to make it 
extremely unlikely that such a turn of phrase was intentional.  Providing for a 
deadline of one day before the end of the year is certainly odd but not quite 
unthinkable in the same way. 
At this point, I might seem subject to a charge of inconsistency.  Earlier, I 
rejected recourse to the “policy context” of a statute as inconsistent with the 
faithful agent theory.233  But haven’t I just now endorsed the use of the selfsame 
policy considerations as a valid source of evidence for rooting out scrivener’s 
errors? 
The seeming inconsistency vanishes once we recall the distinction between the 
conceptual reasons for correcting clerical errors and the evidentiary reasons for 
suspecting that we are faced with such an error.234  Above, I criticized Gold 
because he relied on the policy intuitions of the average reader to ground his 
conceptual justification for correcting errors and absurdities: that higher-order 
conventions allowed judges to simply gloss over the literal meaning of a text when 
that meaning grossly violated widespread intuitions about justice.235  I criticized 
this theoretical account for impermissibly relying on the interpreter’s policy 
judgments in preference to the policy judgments that the legislature clearly 
embedded in the statutory text; this substitution of the interpreter’s value choices 
for those of the legislature’s, I argued, is incompatible with the commitment to 
legislative supremacy that bottoms the theory of textualism, properly understood. 
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But my theoretical account of scrivener’s error is quite different; it is fidelity 
based, crucially relying on an understanding of deference to legislatively selected 
values to justify the correction of texts that inadequately express those value 
selections.  Relying on the profound policy absurdity of certain texts as an 
evidentiary matter to help us know when we are dealing with a clerical error does 
nothing to change the fact that once we have determined, based on the evidence, 
that we are faced with such an error, we are justified in correcting that error, 
according to my theory, for reasons sounding in legislative supremacy rather than 
our own intuitions about the good and the right. 
There is no reason, then, to ignore such policy considerations when trying to 
determine if we are up against a clerical error.  At the other extreme, many 
textualist judges refuse to look at other evidence of error until they have 
determined that the text of the statute is absurd or indeterminate.236  For example, 
in Holloway v. United States,237 the Court dealt with the intent requirement in the 
federal carjacking statute.238  The provision in question provides certain federal 
criminal penalties for “[w]hoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily 
harm takes a motor vehicle” connected with interstate or foreign commerce.239  The 
question at issue in Holloway was whether the intent mentioned in the statute 
required proof “that the defendant had an unconditional intent to kill or harm in all 
events,” or if the requirement was satisfied by “conditional intent,” that is, intent to 
cause death or bodily harm should certain events take place, for example, should 
the owner of the car resist the theft.240 
The Court held that conditional intent sufficed; Scalia dissented, on the 
grounds that “in customary English usage the unqualified word ‘intent’ does not 
usually connote a purpose that is subject to any conditions precedent except those 
so remote in the speaker’s estimation as to be effectively nonexistent—and it never 
connotes a purpose that is subject to a condition which the speaker hopes will not 
occur.”241  Saliently for our purposes, Scalia also urged that “[i]t is not at all 
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implausible that Congress should direct its attention to this particularly savage sort 
of carjacking—where killing the driver is part of the intended crime,”242 
emphasizing that this hypothetical purpose underlying the statute “was a plausible 
congressional purpose in enacting this language—not what I necessarily think was 
the real one. I search for a plausible purpose because a text without one may 
represent a ‘scrivener’s error’ that we may properly correct.”243 
The upshot of this seems to be that Scalia, and the textualists who follow him, 
is more than willing “to consult all public materials,” including legislative history, 
“to verify that what seems to us an unthinkable disposition . . . was indeed 
unthought of,”244 but only if he can find no “plausible congressional purpose in 
enacting th[e] language.”245  From the perspective of the theory I have been 
defending, this threshold requirement of finding absurdity or indeterminacy before 
launching a search for other reliable evidence of error is misguided.  It seems to 
confound the correction of scrivener’s error with the absurdity doctrine: the very 
two doctrines I have argued any plausible textualist theory of scrivener’s error must 
keep distinct.246   
The conceptual justification for the absurdity doctrine is that judges ought to 
rescue Congress from the absurd consequences of its improvidently over or under-
inclusive value choices.  Following Manning, I have asserted that this is at war with 
textualism’s rejection of strong intentionalism, on the one hand, and commitment 
to the faithful agent theory, on the other.  But I have argued that the conceptual 
justification for correcting a clerical error is quite different: judges and citizens owe 
no deference to value choices Congress did not make and did not intend to enact.  
And this justification is entirely unconnected to a threshold requirement of facial 
absurdity or ambiguity.  Such a requirement might be justified on the alternative 
ground that it prevents freewheeling use of the power to correct scrivener’s error by 
restricting the number of errors courts can correct; but since the restriction is 
unconnected with the justification underlying the doctrine, it would be as arbitrary 
a restriction as limiting the correction of scrivener’s errors to cases heard on 
Tuesdays and Thursdays.  While facial absurdity can provide compelling evidence 
that a court is faced with a scrivener’s error, the requirement that a court must find 
facial absurdity or ambiguity before going on to consider the possibility of error is 
rootless and should be abandoned. 
A final restriction on the correction of scrivener’s errors occasionally deployed 
by textualists fares better.  The restriction comes out of Scalia’s dissent from 
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,247 which dealt with a provision of the 
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977,248 which provided 
federal criminal penalties for anyone who “knowingly transports or ships in 
interstate or foreign commerce . . . any visual depiction . . . involv[ing] . . . a minor 
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engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”249  The question facing the court was 
whether the statute required that the defendant know that one of the performers in 
the “visual depiction” was in fact a minor: that is, does “knowingly” apply not only 
to “transports or ships,” but also to the fact that the visual depiction “involves . . . a 
minor”?250  The Court held that the scienter requirement did extend to the 
performer’s age, despite the fact that this was contrary to the most natural reading 
of the text.251   
Scalia dissented, rejecting the majority’s ungrammatical reading of the statute.  
While admitting that “I have been willing, in the case of civil statutes, to 
acknowledge a doctrine of ‘scrivener’s error’ that permits a court to give an 
unusual (though not unheard-of) meaning to a word which, if given its normal 
meaning, would produce an absurd and arguably unconstitutional result,” Scalia 
refused to extend that doctrine to this case because the majority’s reading would 
“give the problematic text a meaning it cannot possibly bear” and because “the sine 
qua non of any ‘scrivener’s error’ doctrine, it seems to me, is that the meaning 
genuinely intended but inadequately expressed must be absolutely clear; otherwise 
we might be rewriting the statute rather than correcting a technical mistake. That 
condition is not met here.”252 
Scalia’s first requirement—that the corrected reading cannot give the text a 
meaning it cannot bear—starts off down the wrong path.  If the theoretical under-
girding of the doctrine of scrivener’s error tells us to correct those errors because 
they are errors, we should clearly care little about ensuring that the corrected 
reading squares with the wording of the text we are finding erroneously-worded in 
the first place.  That this requirement gets us nowhere can be seen by trying to 
apply it to errors that result in deviant texts: textual provisions that are not well-
formed and are for that reason unmeaning clearly can bear no meaning, so the 
search for a corrected meaning that the text will bear is hopeless. 
But Scalia’s second requirement is sound.  If a court is to ignore a value choice 
seemingly expressed by the text in favor of the value choice it believes Congress 
actually meant to enact, it must be sure of what that corrected choice is.  This 
follows from the two crucial roles played by the statutory text: unless we are sure 
of what the actual but erroneously-expressed choice was, we cannot be sure that the 
text has enabled a unified legislative intent to form around a value choice.  And if 
we are unsure of what that choice was, the text clearly has not performed its 
function of communicating it to us.  If a court enforces its best guess in a situation 
like this, it is not deferring to the legislative will; it is legislating from the bench.  
Such an exercise of judicial power runs contrary to the theory of authority-as-
deference that I have argued underwrites textualism.  Confidence about the correct 
reading of an erroneously worded statute, then, can very properly be called “the 
sine qua non of any ‘scrivener’s error’ doctrine.”253 
Generally, near-conclusive proof that an error has occurred will carry with it 
near-conclusive proof of the correct reading.  At least most of the examples we 
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have considered have met this requirement.  In Scurto, for example, the very fact 
that allowing “unlawful” impeachment of testimony is so obviously an error shows 
that the legislature meant to allow “lawful” impeachment.254  Similarly, the high 
improbability that the Maryland statute at issue in Maxwell really meant to exempt 
nearly all property from taxation also meant that it was highly probable that the 
legislature had meant to make all but the specifically exempted classes of property 
subject to taxation.255  But when a court is faced with a statute that clearly contains 
an error but is unable to ascertain the intended reading of the statute with any 
certainty, it should decline both to apply the erroneous text and to invent a 
plausible “corrected” text through judicial fiat. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In this article I have tried to show how an approach to scrivener’s error can 
find conceptual room in a textualist theory of statutory interpretation.  After 
reviewing a few prominent textualist answers to the problem of scrivener’s error, I 
concluded that non-fidelity-based reasons for correcting errors are either too 
narrow to justify correction of the entire class of errors or too broad to be consistent 
with the faithful agent theory, and that fidelity-based reasons are inconsistent with 
intent skepticism.  Intent-skeptical justifications of textualism are, for this reason, 
less desirable than non-skeptical justifications.  I then articulated a non-skeptical 
argument for textualism that relies on the reasons for according authoritativeness to 
legislative value choices and argued that this justification shows why, when faced 
with a scrivener’s error, judges ought to enforce the value choice that the 
legislature intended to embed in the statutory text rather than the one actually 
expressed by the text.  Finally, I argued that syntactic deviance, absurdity, and 
legislative history are all sources of evidence on which textualist judges may 
properly draw to determine the existence of an error but that the judge must also be 
sure of what Congress actually meant to say, before she can enforce a corrected 
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